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As logistics service providers, freight forwarders (FFs) are intermediary parties 
who connect shippers (SPs) to carriers (Cs) in the logistics chain. The focus of 
this research is on non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs) - FFs who 
do not own any vessel but make use of the capacity and shipping network of 
carriers to move cargo on behalf of shippers. Their profits come from the price 
difference between the contract price received from shippers and that paid to 
carriers.  
The purpose of this research is to assist a FF with its pricing decision. In 
the first phase of the research, a game theoretic (GT) approach is proposed to 
investigate how a FF could formulate its optimal pricing decision in face of 
competition when it has complete information of the entire system. The 
potential reactions from other parties (shippers and carriers) and the competition 
from other FFs are taken into account. Pricing decisions by the FF are 
investigated in a situation involving shippers, FFs, and carriers. The approach 
takes into account: 1) shippers’ selection behavior; 2) the potential reactions 
from competing FFs; and 3) the best combination of available capacity from 
carriers.  
In the second phase of the research, learning mechanisms are proposed 
to assist a FF to adapt its pricing decisions over time when it has limited 
information of the entire system. A Multi-Agent System (MAS) is built to 
viii 
 
investigate the interaction between the three parties so that the performance of 
each learning approach can be examined. Multi-agent simulations are conducted 
to investigate the interactions under various combinations of FFs that learn. The 
purpose of conducting the simulation is to investigate whether learning from 
previous transactions can lead to better freight pricing decisions for the FF. 
Which is the best learning mechanism, and how learning and pricing 
performance can be optimized are also questions this research would like to 
answer. The critical parameters that determine learning performance as well as 
the best setting for parameters are investigated as well.  
The third phase of the research aims to help a FF formulate its best 
pricing decisions based on the information that is accessible to it in the real 
world operations. All the information the FF uses to can be obtain in the reality. 
The FF uses its internal information (goals, profit gain or loss, market share gain 
or loss, or quotations are accepted or not) and external information to update its 
pricing decisions over time. Multi-agent simulations are conducted to 
investigate the pricing performance of various learning models under various 
pricing situations. The critical parameters that determine learning performance 
as well as the best settings for these parameters are investigated as well. The 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
	
1.1 Introduction 
Freight forwarders (FFs) face various decisions related to operations 
management in their daily work when facing shippers (SPs) and carriers (Cs). 
Among them, pricing is the process of determining what must be provided by a 
customer in return for a product or service (Schindler, 2012). A FF’s pricing 
decision determines the price for its logistics service. In this regard, a pricing 
decision pertains to the unit cargo movement fees the FF charges a shipper (Fig. 
1.1). Each pricing decision can be represented on a pricing curve, with the 
horizontal axis indicating the volume of cargo and the vertical axis 
corresponding to the unit cargo charge. The shape of the curve distinguishes one 
pricing decision from another. In this research, helping FFs make pricing 
decisions is the same as helping them determine their pricing curve. As shippers 
can go to FFs or directly to carriers for this shipping service, a smart FF needs 
to determine and adjust this pricing curve so as to compete with other FFs and 
carriers. FFs may do so for the reason of pursuing profitability or market share 
in a highly competitive logistics market. They need to be clear about the basis 
of their pricing decisions, their objectives, and the potential reactions and 






When contacted by shippers for logistics services, FFs quote charges based on 
pricing decisions regarding their services. A superior pricing decision aims to 
price as profitably as possible by capturing more value; however the potential 




Fig. 1.1 Pricing decision of FFs 
 
Although a shipper can go directly to a carrier, there are good reasons 
why a shipper might want to outsource to a FF the design of a cargo movement 
plan, as well as the subsequent monitoring and execution of the plan by carriers. 




First, a FF can guarantee demand, space, and level of service (speed, economy, 
and safety) (Burkovskis, 2008). Shippers are mainly concerned about whether 
cargo can be moved from an origin to a destination in a timely manner, at an 
acceptable cost and with a required level of service. Shippers can also acquire 
door-to-door delivery (Y. Li et al., 2009), get rid of unnecessary services and 
additional functions (e.g. transportation, physical distribution of goods, and 
storage) that are not considered core business for a company. Second, shippers 
are able to make use of a mixture of different transportation modes with lower 
transportation cost through FFs (Y. Li et al., 2009). In most cases, carriers 
(airlines or shipping lines) own large capacities for a limited number of 
destinations, while FFs are able to offer more flexible origin-destination pairs 
with access to greater aggregated capacities. Thus specialized third party 
logistics companies can offer competent, reliable, and effective industrial 
logistics services. Because of this, shippers are able to take advantage of 
economies of scale obtained by FFs from carriers and insurance companies even 
though they may only have relatively small amounts of cargo to ship 
(Burkovskis, 2008). Furthermore, shippers eliminate the cost of organizing 
cargo transport themselves. 
There are two main concerns when FFs make pricing decisions: 1) how 
to balance price and volume in order to maximize profit given the cost of cargo 
movement; 2) how to transport received cargo in the most cost-effective manner 





shippers. This research focuses on these two concerns when formulating the 
pricing decisions by FFs so that profitability can be assured. The total profit (TP) 
of FFs comes from the price difference between the contract price received from 
shippers and that paid to carriers, and can be defined as: 
 ;2 = ( 2 − Q − ! (1.1) 
 
Where ( denotes the volume of cargo offered by shippers; 2 denotes 
the unit cargo movement charge – pricing decision; Q denotes the cost to move 
one unit of cargo; ! denotes the fixed cost. The focus of this research is on non 
vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs). For a NVOCC, Q  can be 
estimated based on tariff schemes of carriers. The fixed cost ! is due to the 
overhead of daily operations and management, labor cost, and other costs 
related to infrastructure (rental for offices, equipment, etc.). As articulated by 
Yin and Kim (2012), FFs offer shippers logistics services which can be 
considered as news-vendor type products. FFs, like “newsvendors”, buy slots 
from carriers and sell them to shippers, which makes the services provided by 
FFs look like “newspaper delivering service”: once a particular voyage is 
undertaken, all unutilized slots on board are wasted and cannot be stored. 
Good pricing decisions allow FFs to offer shippers more attractive 
logistics services, as well as remain competitive over other third party logistics 
companies. In a highly competitive market, FFs need to make good pricing 




decisions on their charges to shippers. As a party in the middle of the chain of 
transactions, FFs take into account the pricing decisions by other FFs and 
carriers, and the likely decision making behavior of shippers. In order to attract 
cargo from shippers, FFs compete on price and level of service. FFs should 
propose charges and cargo movement plans by: 1) referring to upstream 
information from shippers (amount of cargo and shippers’ requirements); 2)  
downstream information from carriers (tariff scheme, capacity, and schedule of 
available carriers); and 3) the information about other competing FFs. Learning 
from previous transactions should be incorporated as well so that the 
performance of previous decisions can be evaluated and future decisions can be 
improved. Pricing decisions are then not one-time static decisions but iterated 
over multiple transactions. A good pricing decision should also be made in a 
strategic manner, meaning that a FF should price its service more profitably by 
capturing more value, not necessarily by making more sales but undermining 
profitability.  
 
1.2 Interaction between SPs, FFs, and Cs 
FFs are the middle men who facilitate the interaction between shippers and 
carriers. Shippers have two alternatives when they want to move cargo from an 
origin to a destination: 1) contract the work to one FF (outsourcing shipper); or 
2) design their own cargo movement plan, and contract with carriers to 





key concerns of shippers. When shippers have cargo to be transported, they 
announce the volume of cargo and requirements to FFs. Each FF then quotes 
proposed charges and submits a cargo movement plan based on its pricing 
decision. Shippers decide on which is the better alternative after receiving the 
responses from FFs. If a FF is used, the FF needs to further split the cargo 
received among carriers based on the shippers’ requirements and the carriers’ 
schedule and freight rate. Similarly, self-fulfillment shippers also have to 
consider a cargo split among the carriers. Carriers decide on which FFs to serve 
and whether to adjust their pricing scheme and capacity. 
The relationship between different entities will also affect how the 
interaction between these entities takes place. Carriers are the parties which 
move cargo physically within a transportation network using trucks, vessels, 
and shuttle trains. They want to maximize their own goals, taking into account 
competition from other carriers as well as cargo business from FFs and shippers 
directly. As a man-in-the-middle, a FF can be either a collaborator or a 
competitor for the business of a carrier. FFs work as intermediaries that benefit 
by sharing part of the revenue that should have belonged wholly to carriers. 
Carriers still have an incentive to work with FFs, as the latter can assure carriers 
of a large amount of cargo. By working with FFs, a carrier may also be able to 
receive more cargo volume compared to working on its own. 
 




A general conceptual framework representing the real world interaction 
and information exchange between the three parties is proposed in Fig. 1.2. The 
framework shows the flow of actions starting from the generation of shippers’ 
demand till the cargo movement by carriers. The purpose of proposing the 
framework is to ensure that the key elements of the three-tier interaction are 
captured, including critical features whilst omitting unnecessary details. The 
interaction between shippers, FFs, and carriers can therefore be modeled 
properly in the following chapters.   
 
 






1.3 Research Motivation 
Past research on FFs relevant to this study can be categorized into four main 
streams: (a) shipment decision problems: shipment integration and 
consolidation (Huang & Chi, 2007), routing (Cheung & Hang, 2003), 
infrastructure choice (Tongzon, 2009), logistics service network design 
(Creazza et al., 2010), and loading (Y. Li et al., 2009); (b) capacity management 
problems: either long term (Amaruchkul & Lorchirachoonkul, 2011) or short 
term (Jaržemskis, 2005) allotment booking and planning; (c) interaction with 
other parties - carrier (Yin & Kim, 2012), shipper (Rau et al., 2006)), or 
collaboration (Krajewska & Kopfer, 2006) and coordination (Reinheimer & 
Bodendorf, 1999) with other actors; and (d) behavior research: factors that 
affect a customer’s choice of preferred third party logistics service provider 
(Wen et al., 2011), FFs’ choice between different transportation modes (Feo et 
al., 2011), or other decision making issues that affect FFs (C. S. Lu & Marlow, 
1999). Although there has been an increasing amount of literature on FF 
decision making and operations management, very little has addressed the issue 
of pricing with an objective of assuring profitability. 
Many of the models defined in the research literature are conceived from 
a single perspective, or from the perspective of a unified system where the 
potential reactions of stakeholders and component entities are considered as 
constraints or simply omitted (characterized by system optimality and 
centralized decision making). However, in reality shippers, FFs, and carriers 




can pursue their own goals (characterized by user equilibrium and decentralized 
decision making). They can consider tradeoffs but do not need to sacrifice 
benefits for the achievement of system optimality. Conflict or congruence 
between the goals of different participants brings about competition or 
cooperation, and the decisions made by the different parties will change 
accordingly. What will pricing decisions be if each stakeholder is free to pursue 
its own goals and individual goals need not be subordinated to an overall global 
objective? 
Most of the previous research focuses on optimizing the decision of FF 
only with respect to current information. Learning and feedback from previous 
transactions are not taken into account. However, in a highly competitive market, 
FFs can improve their pricing performance by adapting their decisions vis-à-vis 
their competitors. These decisions should be sensitive to the changes in the 
market as well as the decisions made by other actors. Will pricing performance 
be improved through learning and feedback? 
Much of the literature assumes homogeneity in the profile of 
stakeholders – it is difficult to formulate analytical models that account for 
different objectives, competition and learning strategies among actors in a 
system. How will individual and system performance be affected if profiles of 
stakeholders are allowed to be different? Will the outcome and behavior of the 





system be different from one where all parts of the system are subordinated to 
a global objective? 
 
1.4 Research Scope 
The aim of this research is to develop pricing decisions for FFs in an oversupply 
market by incorporating: 1) the potential reactions from other parties (shippers 
and carriers) and competing FFs; 2) the learning through feedback information 
from past transactions; 3) the interaction between competing FFs with different 
pricing decision making mechanisms. 
In the first phase of the research (Chapter 3 ), a game theoretic (GT) 
approach is proposed to investigate how a FF could formulate its pricing 
decision in face of competition when it has complete information of the entire 
system. The market is assumed oversupplied, and the above GT approach takes 
into account the price preference of shippers and the competition from other 
FFs. The GT approach formulates a FF’s interaction with shipper and carrier as 
a three-level extensive form game; this new formulation extends the previous 
two-level formulation of logistics problems using game theory. This adds more 
complexity but potentially yields new insights as more interdependent decisions 
are included. The problem is formulated in a decentralized manner, with each 
party pursuing its own objective unilaterally but taking into account the 
competitive actions of other parties. Individual objectives are not subordinated 
to an overall objective by using weighted criteria. The decisions that emerge out 




of the individual interactions are more realistic. Under equilibrium conditions, 
each player reaches its optimal decision and no one has the incentive to deviate 
unilaterally in order to improve its outcome. The model formulation emphasizes 
profit maximization rather than just cost reduction or revenue maximization. As 
a FF’s profit is the difference between costs (paid to carriers) and revenue 
(earned from shippers), FFs have to balance costs and revenue objectives in the 
face of volume preference from carriers and price sensitivity from shippers. This 
approach also provides FFs pricing decision support in the determination of a 
reference price to attract business from shippers and compete with other FFs. 
This reference price can be used as a benchmark to examine the pricing 
performance of other pricing decision models. 
In the second phase of the research (Chapter 4 ), learning mechanisms 
are proposed to assist a FF to adapt its pricing decisions over time when it has 
only limited information of the entire system. Including the effect of learning 
allows the study of the system as it evolves and adapts, instead of only the results 
in the final state at equilibrium. In this way, the feedback from previous 
transactions can be incorporated. The work reported in this thesis investigates 
the question of whether learning from previous transactions can lead to better 
freight pricing decisions for FFs. By adapting pricing decisions over time, FFs 
can improve their future decisions by examining the responses from other 
participants and how these responses affect them. A FF capable of learning 





through trial and error - similar to the way humans learn. The RL mechanisms 
proposed in this research are suitable for complex tasks that resist attempts to 
encode them as programs, and can be used even when no training data is 
available (Ertel, 2011). In RL, the preference for actions that bring rewards is 
reinforced, whilst that for actions that lead to loss is weakened. It does not 
require complex formulation and a lot of historical data - it works with only 
current (online) information. RL also does not require complete information of 
the entire system. This is suitable for the situation where FFs need to make 
pricing decisions even though they may have only very limited information. 
They can only refer to their own internal information (gain/loss of profit and 
increase/decrease of market share) and some external information (cargo 
volume and requirements announced by shippers, the acceptance/rejection of 
cargo movement plans and quoted charges, and whether more shippers need 
freight forwarding services). 
In the third phase of the research (Chapter 5 ), the aim is to help a FF 
formulate its best pricing decisions only given the information that is accessible 
to the FF in real world operations. The FF uses its internal information (goals, 
profit gain or loss, or market share gain or loss) and external information to 
update its pricing decisions over time. The following scenarios are also 
examined: 1) there is a short period of under supply; 2) demand and supply are 
allowed to vary; 3) activities can occur at any time.  
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) is also built to investigate the interaction 




between shippers, FFs and carriers so that the performance of each learning 
approach can be examined under various scenarios (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 ). 
The MAS implementation allows experimentation with a system of interacting 
agents representing shippers, FFs, and carriers. Multi-agent simulations enable 
the study of the effect of competition between FFs with different learning 
strategies. The activities in the logistics market are conducted via interactions 
between different actors. The manner in which these interactions take place will 
affect the decisions made by each participant and the outcomes obtained. By 
building a MAS, the behavior of a complex system is reproduced by the 
interaction of simple rules that govern the response of the actors in the complex 
system. Slight changes in interaction rules and behaviors of a single entity, when 
instantiated in many local contexts, may lead to changes of system behavior. A 
MAS does not require complex formulation; instead, it works with simple rules 
that are easily customized. The MAS system can be easily adapted to include 
more problem variables and interactions between problem variables - this 
allows differentiation in the details of pricing and learning mechanisms between 
actors in the research. A MAS can investigate the interaction when each actor 
has its own behavior through having different decision model structure and 
parameters. The interaction between different combinations of actors can also 
be experimented with, and the system behavior that emerges out of simulations 
will be more realistic and meaningful. Furthermore, different decision making 





conducting multi-agent simulations. Simulations of the real world situation 
enable this research to support FFs in their pricing decision. The pricing 
decisions are no longer one time decisions but are decisions that are adapted 
over iterated transactions. Multi-agent simulations are also conducted to 
investigate the interactions between various combinations of FFs that learn.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 1 presents background, motivation, research scope and objective. 
Chapter 2 reviews past research that is related to this study. Chapter 3 describes 
a game theoretic (GT) approach for pricing decisions by a FF when the FF has 
complete information of the entire system. Chapter 4 proposes to  incorporate 
the effect of learning from past transactions in a FF’s pricing decisions when 
the FF only has limited information of the entire system. A multi-agent system 
is built involving shippers, FFs, and carriers. The results of multi-agent 
simulations under various scenarios is presented as well. Chapter 5 examines 
the pricing decision of a FF based on the information that is accessible to him 
in the real world operations. Multi-agent simulations are conducted by 
extending the multi-agent system built in Chapter 4 . Chapter 6 concludes and 
summarizes the whole research.  
 
  




CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
	
2.1 Decision Making Models for FFs  
Existing research on FF decision making and operations management problems 
can be categorized into four main streams. 
The first stream of research focuses on various operations and 
management related issues: shipment integration and consolidation (Huang & 
Chi, 2007), routing and scheduling (Cheung & Hang, 2003), infrastructure 
choice (Gardiner et al., 2005; Tongzon, 2009) (Tongzon, 2009), logistics 
service network design (Creazza et al., 2010), or loading (Y. Li et al., 2009). 
Shipment scheduling and routing problems focus on the determination of an 
optimal route to transport cargo from an origin to a destination using links in a 
logistics service network. FFs need to determine the time to collect cargo from 
shippers, the route on which cargo is transported, and intermediate stops for the 
cargo. Several authors combined the standard shipment scheduling and routing 
problem with backhaul and time window constraints (Cheung & Hang, 2003), 
or with cargo integration and consolidation (Krajewska & Kopfer, 2009; 
Moccia et al., 2011; Uster & Agrahari, 2010). Azadian et al. (2012) investigated 
the movement of time sensitive air-cargo with respect to real-time and historical 
information (flight availability, departure delays, and arrival times). In order to 
make use of economy of scale and acquire quantity discounts from carriers, FFs 
consolidate individual consignments to make up a full container load at the 




origin. This arrangement allows small volumes of cargo from different shippers 
but with the same origin and destination to be transported together so as to offer 
greater security at lower shipping cost. At the destination, the consolidated 
cargo is deconsolidated back into original individual consignments and 
delivered to respective consignees. A lot of research has been conducted on 
shipment consolidation and integration. Huang and Chi (2007) considered air 
FFs’ consolidation problem. Wong et al. (2009) investigated shipment 
integration and consolidation together with FF’s in-house capacity as well as 
the available capacity of its partners and sub-contractors. Leung et al. (2009) 
examined the optimal integrations and consolidations of air cargo shipments 
given a number of jobs and processing units. Z. Li et al. (2012) worked on an 
unsplittable shipment consolidation problem of an air FF. Bock (2010) used a 
new real-time-oriented control approach to expand load consolidation, reduce 
empty vehicle trips, and handle dynamic disturbances by considering vehicle 
breakdowns or deceleration of vehicles, traffic congestion, street blockages as 
well as dynamic incoming transportation requests.  
The second stream of research focuses on the planning and management 
of freight capacity. As NVOCCs do not own any vessels, they need to send all 
the cargo received from shippers onwards to carriers. The demand from shippers 
may vary, and FFs have to decide whether they should book capacity from 
carriers in advance so as to get a discounted freight rate and secure space from 
carriers in anticipation of getting the business from shippers. Booking too much 




space beyond the actual demand will incur extra cost, whilst a lack of space may 
lead to the loss of business opportunities from shippers. Liu et al. (2009) state 
that FFs and carriers should establish a cooperative relationship and form virtual 
enterprise alliances (VEA) directed by contracts. On the other hand, carriers sell 
(or presell) their services to intermediaries (FFs) instead of directly to the real 
shippers (Yin & Kim, 2012). This builds their relationship with the FFs. As the 
service provided by carriers is also newsvendor-like and cannot be stored, FFs 
may consider two kinds of purchases from carriers: long-term contracts and free 
sale (short term purchase) (Jaržemskis, 2005). This will affect the choice of 
preferred carriers and the cargo split among carriers by a FF. It will also 
influence the behavior of carriers when they adjust their tariff scheme and 
decide on the amount of guaranteed capacity for a particular FF. For sustainable 
development in a competitive business market, a carrier cannot design its freight 
tariff merely considering its own profit. A reasonable profit sharing mechanism 
should be considered. Some researchers view the relationship between FFs and 
carriers as a kind of game, in which carriers are rule makers whilst FFs serve as 
newsvendor-type followers (Yin & Kim, 2012). This gives rise to a ‘partner 
selection problem’, which brings new perspectives on how FFs evaluate and 
select partner carriers to work together (Brookes & Altinay, 2011; Ip et al., 2003; 
Pidduck, 2006; Solesvik & Encheva, 2010). 
The third type of research examines the interactions between FFs and 
other parties. Yin and Kim (2012) examined the FF-carrier interaction by 




considering how container lines should set their freight tariff so as to maximize 
expected profit. The authors also discussed how the behavior of FFs (in terms 
of changes in order quantities) would influence the decisions of carriers (in 
terms of the tariff scheme). Liu et al. (2009) examined FF-carrier interaction to 
help FFs select carriers based on decision theory and game theory. Rau et al. 
(2006) considered the negotiations between shipper and FF on unit shipping 
price, delay penalty, due date, and shipping quantity using a learning-based 
approach. Shipper and carrier interaction was also examined in the same article. 
In order to survive in a highly competitive market, some FFs seek opportunities 
for cooperation or collaboration with other independent FFs (Krajewska & 
Kopfer, 2006). Coordination between shippers, FFs and carriers (coordination 
in the vertical dimension) may also bring about win-win scenarios for each of 
these parties. Reinheimer and Bodendorf (1999) considered market orientation 
coordination in the air freight forwarding industry by applying easily accessible 
communication infrastructures as well as investigating qualitative aspects in 
price-finding mechanisms. 
Research on the behavior of FFs comprises the fourth main stream. This 
kind of research examines the behavior of FFs when they do business and make 
decisions. The reasons behind these behaviors and behavioral patterns are also 
included. C. S. Lu and Marlow (1999) explored the strategic differences 
between shipping companies, shipping agencies, and ocean FFs by classifying 
them into four strategic groups based on the key strategic factors obtained from 




factor analysis. As FFs are usually considered to be utility maximizers, Z. Li 
and Hensher (2012) reviewed all past freight behavior studies using Random 
Utility Maximization (RUM) and proposed an alternative behavioral paradigm 
– Rank-Dependent Utility Theory (RDUT) model to incorporate the risk-taking 
attitudes of transporters and shippers rather than the previous risk-neutral 
assumption. To study the effectiveness of freight transport policy, Feo et al. 
(2011) modeled the modal choice between door-to-door road transport and short 
sea shipping available to FFs. Their work identified the critical areas that should 
be addressed by future policy action. Some researchers also investigated the 
decision-making behavior of FFs with respect to: 1) the location selection by 
third party logistics service providers (Shiau et al., 2011); 2) the comparison 
and selection among various alternatives taking into account economic, 
environmental and social sustainability (Simongáti, 2010); 3) logistics service 
network design (Creazza et al., 2010; Lin & Liang, 2011). Burkovskis (2008) 
discussed ways in which a FF effectively participate in the transportation 
process and proposed rules to examine investments in developing freight 
forwarding services. Yang (2012) examined the relationship between the ability 
to innovate by ocean FFs and firm performance. Four critical logistics service 
qualities/capabilities were identified: logistics service reliability, logistics 
value-added service, flexibility, and logistics information services. Cheng and 
Yeh (2007) examined internal and external factors that affect the sustainable 
competitive advantage (SCA) of an air-cargo FF. G. S. Liang et al. (2006) 




identified the link between service management requirements and customer 
needs for an ocean FF by characterizing customer needs by their importance, 
levels of satisfaction, and  the service management. Ducruet and van der Horst 
(2009) verified the role of intermediaries in the transport integration by 
considering the relationship between transport integration and port performance. 
Markides and Holweg (2006) discussed the diversification of services and 
activities by FFs in the UK. Suggestions that would help FF gain more business 
from shippers was offered in the research conducted by Wen et al. (2011). 
 
2.2 Pricing Decisions 
Pricing decisions are the decisions made by sellers or service providers on the 
price for a product or service after examining a multitude of factors such as 
competition, cost, advertising, and sales promotion (AllBusiness, 2015). A 
reasonable price for a product or service is not a single number but rather a range 
of feasible price points. 
Various research has been done on carriers pricing decisions. Chi and 
Koo (2009) examines the pricing behaviors of United States air carriers in 
domestic markets. Mozafari and Karimi (2011) studies pricing and fleet 
management decisions for full-truckload freight carriers, which compete on a 
road network. Mutlu and Çetinkaya (2013) studies a carrier–retailer channel and 
examine the profitability of the centralized and decentralized channels under 
price-sensitive demand. Toptal and Bingöl (2011) studies the transportation 




pricing problem of a truckload carrier in a setting that consists of a retailer, a 
truckload carrier and a less than truckload carrier. Yin and Kim (2012) 
characterize freight rate tafiff freight tariff by price-break points, discounted 
freight rates, and penalties for unsold space. Xu et al. (2010) examines how the 
loss averse effect of downstream customer can affect the decision of carrier to 
maximize its profit through contract price one carrier , one forwarder and a 
downstream customer market. However, not much existing research has been 
done to address the pricing decision of FFs.   
Section 2.2.1 discusses how a FF can identify a range of price points 
using the exchange value method.  FFs aim to capture more profit through price 
but price and demand are interrelated. This issue is discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
 
2.2.1 Price Boundaries 
According to Smith (2012) and Nagle et al. (2011), price is the value that a firm 
captures in a mutually beneficial exchange with its customers. The right price 
is often not a single number but rather a range of potential points (Zone of 
Potential Agreements, ZOPA) that benefits both customers and the firm. Based 
on the exchange value method, FFs could identify a reasonable price interval 
within which they could choose a value as the price of their services, and narrow 
pricing discussions to a reasonable range of price points. 
As shown in Fig. 2.1, two types of boundaries can be identified for a 
product or service - extreme boundaries and narrower boundaries. The extreme 




boundaries define a range of acceptable prices outside which no rational buyer 
or seller would ever transact. The upper and lower bounds of extreme 
boundaries are determined by the full consumer utility and the marginal cost to 
produce. The narrower boundaries, which lie within these extremes, define a 
range of prices that are most likely to encourage customer transactions and leave 
the firm in the most favorable position. The upper and lower bounds of the 
narrower boundaries are determined by the exchange value and inferior 
alternatives. The full consumer utility is the value a costumer gains from having 
the product. The marginal cost to produce is the cost to produce one more unit 
of output. The exchange value of a product is the price of the nearest comparable 
alternative adjusted for the differential value of the product. The comparable 
alternatives are the solutions with which customers can accomplish the same or 
a similar set of goals. The differential value is defined as the change in customer 
utility that a product delivers in comparison to the alternative (exchange value 
= price of comparable alternative + differential value). The inferior alternatives 
are competing alternatives that deliver similar benefits to the one under 
consideration with less overall customer utility. People usually have heightened 
sensitivity in relation to their point of reference (Smith, 2012) - the reference 
price. The last price they paid for a product, the price they currently see or last 
saw on a product form consumers’ reference price for a given product. All the 
definitions and price points mentioned above determine the feasible price range 
of a product or service. 







Fig. 2.1 Price boundaries for a product or service 
 
2.2.2 Price Elasticity of Demand  
In order to make pricing decisions in a strategic manner by capturing more profit, 
FFs should know how price changes will affect the demand they are facing. This 
issue can be investigated by using the concept of price elasticity of demand. 

















a good responds to a change in the price of that good. It is computed as the 
percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage change in 
price (Mankiw, 2012).  Price elasticity of demand reflects how willing 
consumers are to buy less of the good as its price rises. According to Smith 
(2012), a market is considered to be elastic when a small change in price has a 
large effect on the quantity sold; whilst a market is considered to be inelastic 
when a large change in price has only a small effect on the quantity sold. In the 
short run, an elastic market tends to favor price cuts to improve profitability, 
whilst an inelastic market tends to favor price increases to improve profitability. 
The firm-level elasticity of demand is usually greater than or equal to that at the 
industry level.  
The demand for freight transport is determined by demand for physical 
commodities in a given location, which is a derived demand arising from 
customers demand for certain products (Lun et al., 2010). At the industry level, 
FFs face an inelastic market, in which the demand of cargo movement depends 
on the production of manufacturers, the need of end market consumers, and the 
global economic condition rather than the market freight rate. It is because the 
total volume of cargo movement is not highly correlated with the freight rate, 
but depends on the externalities beyond the shipping or freight industry. 
Shippers always have cargo at hand to be transported from an origin to a 
destination. As long as they can find cost-effective ways to do so, they will 
transport the cargo anyway. However, changes of freight rate will have indirect 




effects on the demand of cargo movement. It is because freight rate will affect 
the magnitude of a product’s sale price and its manufacturer’s cost. Finally, the 
need of the product in the market is affected, and the total demand for the 
movement of this product is affected.  
At the firm level, FFs face a relatively more elastic market. Major 
customers with regular and large demand of cargo movement only consider 
price as one of the key issues before signing a contract with a logistics company. 
For example, an automobile manufacturer may also be concerned about the 
level of service, reliability, and timing; therefore they will have a higher 
willingness to pay for more reliable and higher level of service. For the military 
cargo, shippers may highlight timing and reliability over other issues related to 
price or cost. These shippers may also consider previous interactions, and thus 
are willing to pay more as long as they are satisfied with previous experiences. 
On the other hand, for medium or small customers, they are more sensitive 
towards cost, and thus have less willingness to pay. If switching to another 
company could reduce their expenditure, they usually have no incentive to stick 
to the previous company. Many logistics company have noticed their major 
customers to be more stable and loyal, whilst their medium and small customers 
switch service providers very quickly.  
This diversity of the behavior pattern between major customers and 
medium/small customers present FFs the incentive to price segment their 
services in a profit-driven manner. Profit-driven pricing means that a company 




evaluates its success at price management by the profit it generates, rather than 
by customer-driven, share-driven, or even cost-driven pricing. When interacting 
with major clients or someone who is not sensitive to the price, FFs should make 
pricing decisions on a case-by-case basis: trying to balance price, level of 
service and other personalized requirements while guaranteeing the profit. On 
the other hand, when interacting with smaller clients or customers who are 
sensitive to price, FFs should try to attract them with better prices and an 
acceptable level of service to compete with other service providers.  
 
2.3 Game Theory (GT) 
Game theory (GT) offers a valuable economic and mathematical tool to solve 
the decision-making problem in an environment where each decision-maker’s 
actions interact with those of others (Geckil & Anderson, 2010). It is a theory 
which accounts for both independent and interdependent decision making 
(Kelly, 2003) and thus fits the needs of this research. Game theory offers FFs 
the potential to take into account the possible reactions and decision-making 
behaviors of other parties including competing FFs. It aims to find optimal 
solutions to situations involving conflict or cooperation, under the assumption 
that players are instrumentally rational and act in their own best interests (Kelly, 
2003).  
We would like to examine FFs’ decision-making in a “game theoretic 
environment” because the outcome for each individual is affected not only by 




its or her own actions but also by the actions of others (Hargreaves-Heap & 
Varoufakis, 2004). In this way, the interaction between the players can be 
modeled in a mathematical way with the purpose of helping the decision maker 
make its decisions by reasoning about the potential decisions made by other 
players. In the logistics market, each party is comprised of selfish actors aiming 
at optimizing their own goals – they make decisions by reasoning about the 
potential reactions of other interacting actors and predict the potential responses 
from these actors. FFs compete for the limited resources and capacity from 
carriers with the best price. Carriers also compete for business from FFs. On the 
one hand, each actor is free to act independently. A shipper can choose any FF. 
A FF proposes charges to shippers by making its own pricing decision and then 
assigning cargo received to available carriers. Carriers design their freight tariff 
schemes to achieve their own goals.  
This research is inspired by a game theoretic view of supply chain 
management (SCM), which examines the interactions between different players 
to find the equilibrium decision for each decision maker (Groznik & Heese, 
2010; Leng & Parlar, 2005; J. Li & Wang, 2010; J. C. Lu et al., 2012; Ni & Li, 
2012; Wu, 2012). A brief review of game theoretic applications in supply chain 
management can be found in Leng and Parlar (2005). In this type of research, 
game theory is applied to find the equilibrium decision of each player when a 
stable set of circumstances is reached. In this equilibrium state, each player has 
no incentive to unilaterally change and deviate from its current decision. As a 




result, each player has found its optimal decision by considering the reactions 
of the others.  
However, current research focuses more on the interaction between two 
tiers of actors/actions, for instance, between two manufacturers and one retailer 
(Wu, 2012); two horizontally competitive suppliers and their vertical common 
retailer (J. C. Lu et al., 2012); an upstream supplier and a downstream firm (Ni 
& Li, 2012); a single manufacturer and two competing retailers (Groznik & 
Heese, 2010); or competing suppliers and one assembler (J. Li & Wang, 2010). 
In this research, FFs are intermediaries who connect upstream shippers and 
downstream carriers; thus we have to investigate a three-tier interaction between 
shippers, FFs and carriers. The multi-level interaction adds new complexity to 
the problem formulation using game theory. 
In addition, most of the previous research assumes demand to be a 
function of either market size, price and level of service (J. C. Lu et al., 2012; 
Wu, 2012); price related parameters (J. Li & Wang, 2010); or the utility and 
preference of various parties (Groznik & Heese, 2010; Ni & Li, 2012). Typically, 
a demand function is given to describe how these factors will influence the 
demand of a particular player. However, in this research, demand from shippers 
may or may not be elastic due to factors internal to shippers and external market 
conditions. Rather than defining a demand function for FFs, we only take into 
account how the decisions made by FFs will affect those made by shippers. The 
price and level of service by FFs are the only factors deciding a shipper’s 




preference (utility) in selecting a FF. The capacity in the logistics market is taken 
to be inelastic in the short term due to the long lead time required to build vessels, 
the bulky nature of the supply, and the high costs of taking a ship temporarily 
out of service. The emphasis of this research is on how FFs can use available 
information to make pricing decisions when demand and supply are fixed 
Game theory has been applied to examine non-pricing issues related to 
FFs. Saeed (2012) compared vertical and horizontal cooperation among FFs 
using game theory by defining the total demand for a particular FF through its 
customers’ utility (preference) when the FF is selected. This utility is assumed 
to be a function of the charge and level of service (waiting time of customers 
and frequency of trucks) of the FF. Krajewska and Kopfer (2006) proposed 
models for collaboration among independent FFs through a preprocessing phase 
followed by coalition profit optimization and profit sharing phases. Xiao and 
Yang (2007) examined the interaction between shippers, carriers and 
infrastructure companies. In Xiao and Yang (2007)’s work, they focus on the 
equilibrium flows of the system rather than the decision making problems of a 
specific tier by considering the potential behaviors and reactions of other tiers. 
Game theoretic concepts such as sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (J. 
C. Lu et al., 2012; Xiao & Yang, 2007) and backward induction (J. Li & Wang, 
2010; Ni & Li, 2012; Xiao & Yang, 2007) have been applied in supply chain 
management and FF decision making. However, the interaction between all the 
three parties together in the logistics chain has not yet been considered.  





2.4 Reinforcement Learning (RL) 
The objective in reinforcement learning is to improve the performance of an 
entity by building an update policy for various decisions made by the entity. 
This is mainly performed by trial and error without the model of the 
environment, but resulting actions are used to improve the process. Each action 
results in a feedback that may be a reward or a punishment. These data are then 
applied to update the learning models into the future.   
Reinforcement learning mechanisms can be categorized into two types: 
non-associative and associative learning mechanisms. For the non-associative 
reinforcement learning, the actions to be taken by a given player are not 
associated with its current state and vice-versa for the associative learning. 
Action-value and softmax methods for non-associative learning, and state-
action-reward-state-action (SARSA) and Q-Learning methods for associative 
learning are considered in this research. According to Sutton and Barto (1998), 
both the SARSA and the Q-Learning methods are also called Temporal-
Difference (TD) learning methods because the learning is based on a difference 
between the estimates of the value of functions at two different times. The 
advantage of TD-learning methods is to make it possible to learn directly from 
the raw data without a model of the environment.  
With Reinforcement learning, FFs are able to learn from their 
performance in previous interactions, and then use this knowledge to improve 




their future decisions. According to Ertel (2011), at a specific time H , and 
repeatedly over the total time period P, the world can be described by a state )' ∈ T , where the set T is an abstraction of the actual possible states of the 
world. When a particular agent takes an action +' ∈ R at time H, the state of 
the world changes and results in the state )'[\ at time H + 1. A state transition 
function is used to determine the new state )'[\ = V )', +' . This function is 
defined by the environment but cannot be influenced by any actor. After 
executing an action +' at time H, the agent obtains an immediate reward I' =I )', +' , which is always dependent on the current state and the action taken. 
During learning, I' > 0  and I' < 0  result in positive and negative 
reinforcements respectively, and I' = 0  means that the agent receives no 
immediate feedback for the action +'. A decision ?: T → R is a mapping from 
states to actions, which helps the agent learn an optimal decision based on its 
experiences. This is also the goal in RL - a decision is optimal if it maximizes 
reward in the long run. In order to measure the performance of a decision ?, a 
discounted reward is defined to quantify the performance of the decision starting 
at state )': 
 
<= )' = I' + UI'[\ + UdI'[d + ⋯ = U0I'[0f0gh  (2.1) 
 
An alternative average reward function can be used: 





<= )' = 5%ij→f I'[0j0gh  (2.2) 
 
A decision ? is optimal if all states ) satisfy the following condition: 
 <∗ = <=∗ ) ≥ <= )  (2.3) 
 
Based on the concept of dynamic programing (Hillier, 2010), given the 
current state, an optimal decision for the remaining stages is independent of the 
decisions adopted in previous stages. The optimal immediate decision depends 
only on the current state and not on how you got there. As a result, the future 
decisions for the remaining stages will constitute an optimal decision regardless 
of the decision made in previous stages (Taha, 2007). Using the discounted 
reward, we have: 
 <∗ )' = i+7Gm,Gmno,Gmnp,… I' + UI'[\ + UdI'[d + ⋯= i+7Gm I' + U i+7Gmno,Gmnp,… I'[\ + UI'[d + ⋯= i+7Gm I' + U<∗ )'[\  
(2.4) 
 




Then, the optimal decision can be obtained: 
 ?∗ )' = +I@i+7Gm I' + U<∗ V )', +'  (2.5) 
 
In previous research, reinforcement learning has been used to examine 
freight and passenger transportation related issues: for example, the design of 
train marshaling plans considering the group layout of freight cars (Hiroshima, 
2012); the transfer distance of locomotives (Hirashima, 2011); the generation 
of plans for vehicle routing (Mostafa & Talaat, 2010); and the examination of 
uncertainty, bounded rationality, and strategic choice behavior of travelers (Han 
& Timmermans, 2006). However, there has not been work on incorporating 
reinforcement learning in FF’s pricing decision making. 
 
2.5 Multi-Agent System (MAS) 
Multi-agent systems are systems composed of multiple interacting computing 
agents (Wooldridge, 2002). An agent is anything that can be viewed as 
perceiving its environment through sensors and acting upon that environment 
through actuators (Russel & Norvig, 2010). This paradigm has been used to 
represent organizations, functions, resources, and even human beings. MASs 
are considered suitable for the simulation of any phenomenon, scientific or 
behavioral, 




effectively (Govindu & Chinnam, 2007). It is considered to be one of the 
powerful technologies for the development of large-scale distributed systems to 
deal with the uncertainty in a dynamic environment (Chen & Cheng, 2010). This 
technology is motivated by the desire to get deeper insight into the system that 
is not captured by traditional modeling approaches (Borshchev, 2013).  
According to Russel and Norvig (2010), an agent is able to interact with 
its environment through sensors and actuators (shown in Fig. 2.2). In general, 
an agent’s choice of action at any given instant can depend on the entire percept 
sequence observed to date. The percept refers to the agent’s perceptual inputs 
at any given instant, and the percept sequence refers to the complete history of 
everything the agent has ever perceived. As a result, the behavior of an agent 
can be described by the action that is performed after any given sequence of 
percepts. The agent function represents an agent’s external characterization and 
internal rules or principles that guide the agent’s decision-making. It maps any 
given percept sequence to an action. An agent function is implemented by an 
agent program which describes what percepts an agent will take as input and 
what actions will be returned. These percepts may include current information, 
information learnt via past experience as well as the anticipation of the future. 
Agents are categorized into four main types: simple reflex agent, model-based 
reflex agents, goal-based agents, and learning agents. Details of each type of 
these agents are presented in Table 2.1.  
 





Fig. 2.2 Agent and its interaction with the environment (Russel & Norvig, 
2010) 
 




Table 2.1 Different types of agents (Russel & Norvig, 2010) 
Agent type Descriptions 
Simple reflex agents 
They select actions on the basis of the current percept 




They maintain some sort of internal state and keep this 
state updated as time goes by. They also have some 
sort of knowledge regarding how the world evolves 
independently of the agent and how the agent’s own 
action influences the world in a given internal stage. 
After examining all the above aspects, they make 
decisions based on condition-action rules. 
Goal-based agents 
They maintain a current state description (similar to 
model-based reflect agent) together with a sort of goal 
information that describes situations that are 
desirable. 
Utility-based agents 
Compared with goal-based agent, utility-based agents 
provide a more general performance measure by 
utility rather than just provide a binary distinction 
between “happy” and “unhappy”. 
Learning agents 
They are capable of learning from past actions to 
improve the performance of future decisions.  





This research is also inspired by the multi-agent approach applied in 
supply chain management, in which MAS technology is used to facilitate the 
modeling and simulation of a supply chain and its dynamics (Fox et al., 2000; 
J. Li & Chan, 2013; Swaminathan et al., 1998). A review related to multi-agent 
systems application in supply chain management can be found in Lee and Kim 
(2008). Zhang et al. (2006) considered integrating manufacturers’ production 
activities with suppliers, customers and partners within wide and open supply 
chain networks to help manufacturers remain competitive in complex global 
political and economic scenarios. Pan and Choi (2013) used a multi-agent 
approach to consider the negotiation on price and delivery date between 
manufacturer and supplier in fashion supply chain. W. Y. Liang and Huang 
(2006) used agent-based technology to forecast demand in a multi-echelon 
supply chain.  
MAS technology has also been used to examine non-pricing issues 
related to FFs. Chan et al. (2012) proposed a multi-agent-based framework to 
enhance the automation of cargo consolidation and equalization in the air 
industry, and to facilitate cargo processing and generation of flight plans. Air 
cargo received by a FF can be processed more efficiently and flight plans can 
be generated automatically for FFs. Shum and Ng (2010) proposed an agent-
based framework to streamline cargo handling for air freight forwarding 
industry. However, there has not been any work done to model the interaction 




between FFs and other parties using a MAS approach; neither has there been 
work on using the MAS framework to support the pricing decision by FFs. 
 
2.6 Gaps and Future Research Needed 
First of all, there has not been much work addressing the issue of pricing 
decisions by FFs in a situation involving shippers, FFs, and carriers. Operations 
research and mathematical programming are the most commonly used problem 
solving approaches. Problems are typically described from a single perspective 
or from the perspective of the whole system (system optimality and centralized 
decision making). The potential reactions of other entities are considered as 
constraints or simply omitted. However, in reality shippers, FFs, and carriers 
can pursue their own goals (user equilibrium and decentralized decision 
making). They can consider tradeoffs but do not need to sacrifice benefits for 
the achievement of system optimality. Conflict or congruence between the goals 
of different participants brings about competition or cooperation, and the 
decisions made by the different parties will change accordingly. However, it is 
difficult to say which goal, user equilibrium or system optimality, is better: 
system optimality improves the gains from the perspective of the whole system, 
whilst sub-system optimality, or user equilibrium, is more realistic in the real 
world implementation. In the real world most rational entities aim at 
maximizing their own goals, and will only consider achieving system optimality 
when their payoffs can be improved. Under the system optimality condition, the 




sum of all individuals’ gains is maximized and the sum of individuals’ payoffs 
under the system optimality condition will be no worse than that in sub-system 
optimality condition, which brings the incentives for different entities to 
cooperate and coordinate to achieve system optimality. In addition, these 
decisions should also be sensitive to the market, as well as to the decisions made 
by other participants. Game theory appears to be the best means of considering 
all the above issues when examining the pricing decisions of FFs. A game 
theoretic approach for a FF’s pricing decision is presented in Chapter 3 .  
In addition, most of the literature presented in Section  2.1focuses on 
optimizing the decision of FFs only with respect to current information, and 
learning from previous transactions has not been incorporated. However, in a 
highly competitive market, FFs can improve their pricing performance by 
adapting their decisions vis-à-vis their competitors. These decisions should be 
sensitive to the changes in the market as well as the decisions made by other 
actors. In this research, reinforcement learning is proposed to assist FFs in their 
pricing decisions. How learning approaches can be incorporated in a FF’s 
pricing decision is proposed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 .  
Further more, in operations research models, even though it is claimed 
that optimal decisions (for FFs) can be derived via these models, these optimal 
solutions do not take account of iterated decision making among FFs, shippers 
and carriers. In the real world, goals and objectives are likely to change 
depending on information received as a result of interaction between the parties 




and through negotiation. The nature of the interaction also depends on the 
decisions made by the different parties. In other words, the negotiation between 
FFs and shippers or carriers can play a significant part in the decisions of all 
participants but this interaction has rarely been taken into consideration in 
previous research. The current “optimal” decision may not be optimal across 
the whole planning horizon, because the environment and the behavior of 
different participants may change and evolve over time. Multi-agent system 
(MAS) is a suitable technique to evaluate the various pricing decisions 
approaches that can be adopted by FFs. In a multi-agent simulation, each 
participant is represented by a software agent, which functions as an 
autonomous entity able to sense the environment and react accordingly. 
Through MAS, it is possible to examine the effect various decision making 
approaches adopted by FF. Multi-agent systems are built and multi-agent 
simulations are conducted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 .   
 
  








This chapter presents a game theoretic (GT) approach to assist FFs with their 
pricing decisions. The aim of this chapter is to investigate how a given FF can 
formulate its optimal pricing decision in face of competition when it has 
complete information of the entire system. The potential reactions from other 
parties (shippers and carriers) and the competition from other FFs are taken into 
account by applying game theory. The information that is available to the FF is 
shown in Fig. 3.1. About the internal information, the FF knows its own 
objective as well as its preference when selecting preferred carriers. About the 
external information on shippers, the FF knows: 1) number of shippers; 2) each 
shipper’s demand of cargo movement; 3) each shipper’s selection behavior for 
the preferred FF; and 4) each shipper’s objective. About the external 
information on competing FFs’, the FF knows: 1) number of competing FFs; 2) 
each competing FF’s objectives; and 3) selection behavior of preferred carriers. 
About the external information on carriers, the FF knows: 1) number of carriers; 
2) each carrier’s selection behavior of preferred FFs; 3) full freight rate scheme; 
and 4) capacity.         
In this chapter, the real world interaction between shippers, FFs, and 




carriers (discussed in Section 1.2 ) is represented as an extensive form game. A 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) model is used to represent the selection behavior of 
shippers. The concepts of Nash equilibrium in an extensive form game and 
backward induction are used to solve the equilibrium pricing decision under 
different scenarios. The results of the study give an insight into: 1) how a FF’s 
equilibrium prices are determined in face of competition under various 
scenarios; 2) how a FF could achieve optimal pricing performance in face of 
competition; and 3) how various key factors (demand, shipper’s price sensitivity 
etc.) affect a FF’s pricing performance in the game. Several practical 
suggestions for FFs in pricing decisions are proposed. 
 





Fig. 3.1 A FF is able to access full information of the entire system 
	




3.2 Representing the Interaction between SPs, FFs and Cs as a 
Game 
This research proposes to model the three-party interaction between shippers 
(829), FFs (!!0), and carriers (,.) as an extensive form game. The focus is on 
the pricing decision by FFs. Fig. 3.2 describes the game from the perspective of 
a particular 829 . The total analysis horizon is divided into P analysis time 
periods, and within each analysis period H this game has the following moves: 
• Move 1: 829 decides either to use a FF (rs\) or design its own cargo 
movement plan (6s\). All shippers make their decision simultaneously 
based on the information made available to them – FFs’ proposed 
charges (or carriers’ tariff scheme), schedule and level of service. 
o rs\: 829 selects one FF, and this FF receives all the cargo from 829 (outsourcing shipper). 
o 6s\ : 829  implements its own cargo movement plan (self-
fulfillment shipper, 8!9). 
• Move 2: Self-fulfillment shippers (6sd ) and FFs (rsd ) assign cargo 
among available carriers simultaneously. 
• Move 3: carriers move cargo to the destination and adjust their tariffs 
(6st, rst). The game advances to the next analysis period (H + 1) and 
starts again from move 1. 
 





Fig. 3.2 Extensive form game between shipper, FF and carrier. 
 
3.3 Non-Cooperative Game between SPs, FFs and Cs 
3.3.1 Game Description and Assumptions 
As shown in Fig. 3.3, an example involving two shippers (829, : = 1,2), two 
FFs (!!u, % = 1,2) and two carriers (,., 1 = 1,2) is used to illustrate how a given 
FF can make pricing decisions using the proposed GT approach. 
It is assumed that 829 needs to transport <9 unit of cargo from an origin 
A to a destination B.  Both shippers want to transport cargo between the same 
origin and destination pair. There are two carriers serving the above OD pair, 




and they are available to both FFs. ,. has an available capacity of ,-., and its 
charging scheme is denoted as 6. 7  -  the unit cargo movement charge with 
respect to a given cargo volume 7. 
The demand comes from shippers, which is supposed to be satisfied by 
supply offered by carriers. On the supply side, the market is assumed to be 
oversupplied: the total supply offered by carriers is greater than the demand for 
cargo movement – both carriers have more than enough capacity to meet the 
demand from both shippers. In order to take into account competition between 
FFs for the most cost-effective carrier, it is assumed that each carrier has the 
capacity to serve the demand of any shipper, but neither carrier can service the 
combined demand from both shippers. 
We also assume that the supply from carriers may fluctuate but not 
rapidly in the short term. Carriers may adjust their fleet size in response to 
demand but that is not the focus of this research. We adopt the above 
assumptions because the emphasis of the research is on the design of pricing 
decisions by FFs in a competitive oversupplied market. The problem is to 
formulate a pricing decision by taking into account the potential reactions of 
other actors, given the demand from shippers and the supply from carriers. A FF 
assures its own profitability if it can beat its competitors’ prices. However, 
pricing by FFs will influence a shipper’s selection of a preferred service provider.  
The vertical interaction between shippers and FFs as well as that 
between FFs and carriers are incorporated in this game. Under the assumption 




of non-cooperative behavior, each player is assumed to be a selfish entity trying 
to maximize its own goals.   
 The first stage of the vertical interaction happens between shippers and 
FFs. The goal of the shippers is to minimize their total cargo movement cost. 
They are both outsourcing shippers, and independently choose one FF based on 
charges proposed by the FFs. They have no incentive to split the cargo between 
FFs because outsourcing by shippers is common in the real world operations. 
Most of the shippers do not want to design and execute their own cargo 
movement plans. Instead, they prefer to partner third party logistics companies 
and rid themselves of non-core services and additional functions that are not 
typical for a company. The FFs are assumed to be NVOCCs, and their goal is to 
maximize individual total profit. No FF has the incentive to cooperate with the 
other; instead, they compete for limited cargo from shippers and available 
capacity from carriers. Communication and information exchange are not 
possible between the FFs, and they do not form a coalition.  
The second stage of the vertical interaction happens between FFs and 
carriers. FFs’ objective is to minimize cost by splitting cargo among available 
carriers by making the best combination of carriers. In the end, carriers transport 
cargo physically from origin to destination. Carriers’ objectives are represented 
by their charging schemes. But how carriers adjust their pricing scheme is not 
the focus of this research. 
 Horizontal competitions within tiers are also incorporated in this game. 




FFs compete for business from shippers by proposing prices, and compete for 
the most cost-effective carrier by splitting cargo between carriers. The 
competition between carriers is represented by carriers’ charging scheme. It is 
assumed that carriers always prefer FFs offering larger volume of cargo. The 
compotation between shippers is not considered for current research.  
 
 
Fig. 3.3 Research context for GT approach 
	
 
3.3.2 Game-Theoretic Approach for FF Pricing Decision 
In the six-player game, going from move 1 to move 2 can be treated as an 
extensive-form game, in which each player knows the sequence of its moves. In 




order to obtain the equilibrium decision for each player, the game is divided into 
two sub-games - a sub-game is a small portion of a game starting at a specific 
node of the entire game (Geckil & Anderson, 2010). In this example, two sub-
games are identified: a) sub-game 1 - interaction between shipper and FF; b) 
sub-game 2- interaction between FF and carrier. The decision of each player is 
in a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in an extensive form game 
when these decisions constitute a Nash equilibrium in each of the sub-games 
(Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis, 2004). A specific player will make its own 
utility-maximizing decision, given the decision of ‘‘upper level’’ players and the 
information of ‘‘lower level’’ players (Xiao & Yang, 2007). “Upper level” 
players are the ones who have finished their moves, and ‘‘Lower level’’ players 
are the ones who will move afterwards by referring to the move of this player. 
In order to find the Nash equilibrium of this game, the concept of backward 
induction (Hargreaves-Heap & Varoufakis, 2004) is applied, where a player 
moving first will consider what the player moving next would do. Players work 
out their best decisions by reasoning backwards and inducing their beliefs about 
what constitutes the wisest choice by starting at the end and then moving to the 
beginning. By using backward induction, the analysis begins from the end of 
the game to its beginning, i.e. first sub-game 2 and then sub-game 1 is 
considered.  
In sub-game 2, the problem for FFs is how to assign cargo received from 
shippers among carriers. Here, it is assumed that shippers’ decision about the 




choice of FF is already known, and FFs need only to consider how to devise a 
combination of carriers to minimize costs for the volume of cargo received.  
In sub-game 1, each shipper chooses a particular FF according to price 
sensitivity and allocates all the cargo to it. FFs need to set the price of their 
services by maximizing their own profits. From sub-game 2, FFs receive 
information on the payment to carriers. With this information, FFs are able to 
determine their own charges to quote to shippers so as to generate profits in this 
sub-game.  
 
3.3.2.1 Sub-game 2: Interaction between FFs and Cs 
Sub-game 2 represents the interaction between FFs and carriers. If ;<0 units of 
cargo are received from shippers in sub-game 1, !!0 proceeds to split the cargo 
between the carriers in this sub-game. Although there is an oversupply of 
capacity in the market, it is assumed that a single carrier cannot handle all the 
cargo from both shippers simultaneously. As a result, both FFs compete for 
capacity from the more cost-effective carrier, and the decision of one FF will 
affect that of the other. If both FFs propose to give their cargo to the same carrier 
simultaneously, one or both of them will lose economy of scale because of the 
need to split part of the cargo to the other carrier. As a result, both FFs are 
willing to contract with the carrier with the lower freight rate to avoid splitting 
cargo so as to enjoy the economy of scale and the quantity discount.    




The aim of both FFs is to reduce the total costs that may occur. A given 
carrier’s remaining capacity to !!0 equals to its total capacity less the space that 
has already been given to the other !!0 (the competitor to !!0 is denoted as !!0). 
As a result, the cargo splitting plan of !!0	 % = 1,2  can be expressed as the 
following optimization model: 
 




70.. = ;<0 (3.2) 
  
70.. = ;<0 (3.3) 
	  
0 ≤ 70. ≤ ,-. − 70.	, 1 = 1,2 (3.4) 
 
Where,	?!0 is the total cargo movement cost to !!0; 70. is the volume of 
cargo !!0 intends to offer to ,.; 70. is the volume that ,. has already accepted 




from the other !!0; and 6. 7  is ,.’s unit cargo charge with respect to cargo 
volume 7. The objective of !!0 is to minimize total payment (cost) to carriers 
(Equation (3.1)). Constraint (3.2) ensures that all the cargo received by !!0 is 
transported. Constraint (3.3) ensures that the potential reaction of the other !!0 
is taken into consideration. Constraint (3.4) ensures that the volume of cargo !!0  intends to give a carrier is within its current available capacity. In the 
formulation, !!0  takes into account the potential move of the other !!0  by 
involving the other FF’s decision variable 70. in its decision making problem 
(constraint(3.3)), because the moves of !!0 and !!0 are represented by 70. and 70. respectively. However the value of 70. is treated as known in the decision 
making problem of !!0. !!0’s optimal response (70.∗ ) when !!0’s reaction (70.) is given can be 
expressed as: 
 70.∗ ∈ +IDO%H	?!0 70.∗ 70	.  (3.5) 
 
It is obvious that 70.∗  is a function w0 ∙  of 70	., and thus the best reaction 
of !!0 when the reaction of the other !!0 is known would be (the two carriers 
are notated as ,. and ,. respectively): 
 




70.∗ = w0 70. 					70.∗ = ;<0 − 70.∗  (3.6) 
 
Based on equation (3.6), the Nash equilibrium solution for both FFs is 
obtained by solving the following set of equations: 
 70.∗ = w0 70. 						70.∗ = ;<0 − 70.∗ 	70.∗ = w0 70. 					70.∗ = ;<0 − 70.∗  (3.7) 
 
It is assumed that both carriers are using linear pricing schemes with 
quantity discount (equation (3.8)), in which +. represents the carrier’s marginal 
cost, and C. is a parameter affecting the profit distribution between carriers 
(Xiao & Yang, 2007): 
 6. 7 = +. − C.7	, 1 = 1,2	 (3.8) 
 
Upon substituting equation (3.8) into equation (3.1), the cost function of !!0 becomes: 
 




?!0 = +. − C.70.. 70. (3.9) 
 
It is assumed that both carriers prefer the FF with the larger cargo 
volume, and will serve that FF first before allocating the remaining capacity to 
the other FF. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that ;<\ > ;<d (when ;<\ = ;<d, both carriers become indifferent to the choice between FFs). Then, 
this sub-game can be solved as a Stackelberg game: !!\ moves first to assign 
cargo between the carriers, followed by !!d  assigning cargo by using the 
remaining capacity. 
With % = 1, minimizing (3.9) with respect to constraints (3.2) to (3.4) 
results in the optimal move for !!\: 
 




F0 = +\ − +d + 2Cd;<02C\ + 2Cd  (3.11) 
 
Following this, !!d assigns its cargo by making use of the remaining 




capacity of both carriers. With % = 2 and 7\\∗ , minimizing (3.9) with respect to 
constraints (3.2) to (3.4) results in the optimal response of !!d: 
 




O = 2;<d + ,\ − ,d + 7\d∗ − 7\\∗4 	
− ;<d − ,d + 7\d∗ + ,\ − ;<d − 7\\∗4 	 (3.13) 
 
(7\\∗ , 7d\∗ ) is a Nash equilibrium because both FFs’ decisions are the best 
responses given the reactions of the other. This is the best outcome either can 
achieve by competing against each other. Both have no incentive to deviate from 
this equilibrium unilaterally because deviating will not make either of them 
better off. 
 
3.3.2.2 Sub-game 1: Interaction between SPs and FFs  
In this sub-game, each shipper needs to choose one FF based on its own price-
preference. According to discrete choice theory (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985), 




a decision maker’s choice from a set of mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive alternatives can be modeled on the assumption of utility 
maximization. The alternative with the highest utility among the available 
alternatives should be selected. The utility function of a decision maker is 
formulated in terms of observable independent variables and unknown 
parameters. Because it is impossible to specify and estimate a discrete choice 
model that will always succeed in predicting the choice of an individual, the 
concept of randomness is invoked. The true utility of the alternatives is 
considered a random variable, and the probability that an alternative is chosen 
is defined as the probability that it has the greatest utility among the alternatives. 
Therefore, when 829 faces the choice between two alternative FFs, its utility 
when selecting !!0 can be defined as: 
 /90 = E90 + M90	 (3.14) 
 
Where E90 is the systematic (representative or deterministic) component 
of /90, and M90 is the random part (disturbances or random components). In this 
research, the deterministic part of 829’s utility when choosing !!0 is defined as: 
 E90 = K9 − L9230	 (3.15) 
 
Where 230 is the pricing decision of !!0 , and K9 and L9 are positive 




constants associated with 829’s preference when selecting a FF. L9 reflects the 829’s sensitivity towards price, and is associated with a negative sign because 
increasing price makes the choice of that FF less preferred. Based on the 
multinomial logit (MNL) model, the probability for 829 to choose !!0 can be 
quantified as: 
 
B90 = W 230, 230 = z{|}z{|} + z{|}	 (3.16) 
 
Where B90 is a function of both 230 and 230. Each FF then needs to set 
the price of its services so as to maximize its own profit. Sub-game perfection 
assumes that at each stage of the game, players’ actions are the best replies to 
one another when players know the precise “node” they are at (Hargreaves-
Heap & Varoufakis, 2004). However, in this example, both FFs do not know 
this “node” because the amount of cargo they receive depends on their pricing 
decision 230, which affects shippers’ preference towards a FF. Furthermore, the 
price per unit cargo paid to carriers depends on the total amount of cargo the FF 
receives. If the proposed charges are too high, a FF may risk not getting any 
cargo from shippers. However, if the proposed charges are too low, the revenue 
obtained may not be sufficient to cover payment to the carriers even though the 
FF receives more cargo. In order to solve this sub-game, the concept of 
sequential equilibrium is used. Sequential equilibrium is aimed at composing 




decisions which are the best replies to another player’s actions in stages of a 
game where players are uncertain regarding their precise location (or node) in 
the game. For a given FF, four possible scenarios can be identified with respect 
to its location in sub-game 1. Although each FF cannot tell which scenario will 
occur, the probability of each scenario can be estimated. 70.4  is defined as the 
amount of cargo !!0 offers to ,. in scenario 5 , where 5 = 1,2,3,4 . Table 3.1 
shows the four possible scenarios, where 24 is the probability for scenario 5 to 
occur; DE40 is the amount of cargo !!0 obtains in scenario 5 ; and J40 is !!0 ’s 
average unit cost in scenario 5. 
 
Table 3.1 Possible scenarios 
Scenario 5 Probability 24 Cargo volume – DE40 
Average unit 
cost – J40 !!\ !!d !!\ !!d 
1 2\ = B\\Bd\ cE\\ = V\ + Vd cE\d = 0 J\\ P-. 
2 2d = B\dBdd cEd\ = 0 cEdd = V\ + Vd P-. Jdd 
3 2t = B\\Bdd DEt\ = <\ DEtd = <d Jt\ Jtd 
4 2Å = B\dBd\ DEÅ\ = <d DEÅd = <\ JÅ\ JÅd 
 
The average unit cost (J40) for !!0 in scenario 5 can be estimated as: 
 




J40 = 6. 70.Ç 70.Ç. 70.Ç. 	 (3.17) 
 
Because 829  will chose one FF and has no incentive to split cargo 
among different FFs, B90	 : = 1,2  will always satisfy the following equations: 
 B90 + B90 = 1	 (3.18) 
 
Using Table 3.1, the expected total profit of !!0	 % = 1,2   can be 
calculated as: 
 
N ;20 = 24DE404 230 − J40 	 (3.19) 
 
Based on Equation (3.19) and Table 3.1, the expected profit of !!0	 % = 1,2  
can be calculated as: 
 N ;2\ = B\\Bd\ <\ + <d 23\ − J\\ + B\\Bdd<\ 23\ − Jt\+ B\dBd\<d 23\ − JÅ\ 	 (3.20) 
	  




N ;2d = B\\Bdd <\ + <d 23d − Jdd + B\\Bdd<d 23d − Jtd+ B\dBd\<\ 23d − JÅd  (3.21) 
 
The first order derivative of the expected total profit of !!0	 % = 1,2  is: 
 
ÉN ;2\É23\ = 23\<\ − <\Jt\ − Bd\<\J\\ − Bd\<dJ\\+Bd\<\Jt\+Bd\<dJÅ\ ÉB\\É23\




= −23d<\ − <dJtd + Bdd<dJdd + Bdd<\Jdd+Bd\<dJtd+Bd\<\JÅd ÉB\\É23d
+ −23d<d − <\JÅd + B\d<\Jdd + B\d<dJdd+B\\<dJtd+B\\<\JÅd ÉBd\É23d + B\d<\+ Bdd<d	
(3.23) 
 
According to Equation (3.16), we obtain: 
 B90zÑ|} = zÑ|} 1 − B90 	 (3.24) 
 
Taking the logarithm of both sides of Equation (3.24) yields: 
 




 5H(B90) + /90 = /90 + 5H	(1 − B90)	 (3.25) 
 
Taking first order derivative of both sides of Equation (3.25) with 
respect to 23\ results in:  
 1B9\ ÉB9\É23\ − 11 − B9\ É 1 − B9\É23\ = 1B9\ ÉB9\É23\ + 11 − B9\ É B9\É23\= −L9	 (3.26) 
 
Then we will obtain: 
 É B9\É23\ = −L9B9\ 1 − B9\ = 39	 (3.27) 
 
Similarly, we can obtain: 
 É B9\É23d = L9B9\ 1 − B9\ = −39 (3.28) 
 
Solving Equation (3.29) with respect to Equation (3.27) and Equation 
(3.22) results in the optimal pricing decision 23\∗ for !!\ given the reaction of 




!!d (shown in Equation (3.30)). Similarly, Solving Equation (3.29) with respect 
to Equation (3.28) and Equation (3.23)results in the optimal pricing decision 23d∗ for !!d given the reaction of !!\ (shown in Equation (3.33)). Then we 
calculate the first order derivative of total profit for !!0	 % = 1,2 , and set it 
equal to zero: 
 ÉN ;20É230 = 0	 (3.29) 
 
The optimal pricing decision for !!\ given the reaction of !!d can be 
calculated as: 
 23\∗ áàp
= 3\ <\Jt\ + Bd\(\ + 3d <dJÅ\ + B\\(\ − B\\<\ − Bd\<d3\<\ + 3d<d 	 (3.30) 
 
Where: 
 (\ = <\ + <d J\\ − <\Jt\ − <dJÅ\	 (3.31) 
  
39 = −L9B9\ 1 − B9\ 	 (3.32) 
 




Similarly, we obtain the optimal pricing decision for !!d  given the 
reaction of !!\: 
 23d∗ áào
= 3\ <\JÅd + Bdd(d + 3d <dJtd + B\d(d − B\d<\ − Bdd<d3\<\ + 3d<d 	 (3.33) 
 
Where: 
 (d = <\ + <d Jdd − <dJtd − <\JÅd	 (3.34) 
 
Equations (3.30) and (3.33) are the optimal pricing decision of !!0	 
when the decision of !!0 is known. These equations represent the response rules 
regarding how a given FF could react to the pricing decisions made by the other 
FF. We note that 230∗ is a function of B90, B90, B90, B90 , and B90 is a function of 230, 230, L9, L9  – indicating how the decisions of the other FF and shippers 
are involved; however, neither 23\∗ nor 23d∗ can be given in closed form. The 
equilibrium pricing decisions for both FFs can be obtained by solving the 
system of equations constituting of (3.30) and (3.33): 
 




23\∗ áàp = 3\ <\Jt\ + Bd\(\ + 3d <dJÅ\ + B\\(\ − B\\<\ − Bd\<d3\<\ + 3d<d23d∗ áào = 3\ <\JÅd + Bdd(d + 3d <dJtd + B\d(d − B\d<\ − Bdd<d3\<\ + 3d<d 	(3.35) 
 
For optimality, the second order derivative of N ;20  at 230∗ should 
satisfy: 
 ÉdN ;20É(230)d áà}gáà}∗ < 0	 (3.36) 
 
The second order derivative of N ;20  at 230∗ (shown in Equation (3.36)) can 
be expressed as: 
 ÉdN ;2\É(23\)d = 2<\ − 3d(\ 3\ + 2<d − 3\(\ 3d
+ 23\<\ − <\Jt\ − Bd\(\ ÉdB\\É(23\)d
+ 23\<d − <dJÅ\ − B\\(\ ÉdBd\É(23\)d	
(3.37) 
 




ÉdN ;2dÉ(23d)d = 2<\ − 3d(d 3\ + 2<d − 3\(d 3d
+ −23d<\ + <\JÅd + 1 − Bd\ (d ÉdB\\É(23\)d
+ −23d<d + <dJtd + 1 − B\\ (d ÉdBd\É(23d)d	
(3.38) 
 
Taking the second order derivative on both sides of Equation (3.25) with 
respect to 23\ and 23d results in: 
 ÉdB9\É(23\)d = É39É23\ = 2L939B9\ − L939	 (3.39) 
  
ÉdB9\É(23d)d = 2L939B9\ − L939	 (3.40) 
 
Substituting Equation (3.39) into Equation (3.37), and Equation (3.40) 
into Equation (3.38) respectively results in: 
 ÉdN ;2\É(23\)d áàogáào∗= 3\ 2<\ + L\ − 2L\B\\ −23\<\ + <\Jt\ + (\Bd\ − (\3d+ 3d 2<d − (\3\ + Ld − 2LdBd\ −23\<d + <dJÅ\ + (\B\\ 	 (3.41) 





ÉdN ;2dÉ(23d)d áàpgáàp∗= 3\ 2<\ + L\ − 2L\B\\ −23d<\ + <\JÅd + (dBdd − (d3d+ 3d 2<d − (d3\ + Ld − 2LdBd\ −23d<d + <dJtd + (dB\d 	
(3.42) 
	  
3.4 Numerical Experiment 
In this section, the problem formulations of the preceding sections are used to 
solve numerical experiments. The results of these numerical simulations are 
useful in drawing insights into FF’s pricing decisions under competition. The 
effect of shippers’ price sensitivity and level of demand can also be studied. This 
has useful implications for FFs. 
Assume that two shippers want to move containers from city A to city 
B. Each shipper is going to outsource their vehicle movement tasks to a FF. 
There are two FFs in the market, and they are available to both shippers. Two 
vessels (carriers) serve the route from city A to city B, and both FFs are going 
to make use of these two carriers to design their cargo transportation plans. 
Other than mentioned above, all the other features of the three-tier interaction 
remain unchanged as shown in Fig. 3.3. The two shippers (82\ & 82d) need to 
transport <\ = 250  TEUs and <d = 200  TEUs respectively, and the two 
carriers (,\  & ,d ) can both provide slots for D+\ = D+d = 300  TEUs. The 
charging scheme (all-in price) of both carriers is shown in Fig. 3.4. 





Table 3.2 The charging scheme of carriers Cã aã bã caã Description 
C\ a\ = 650 b\ = 0.6 ca\ = 300 Prefer the FF who 
offers larger 
volume of cargo Cd ad = 600 bd = 0.3 cad = 300 
 
 
Fig. 3.4 The charging scheme of both carriers 
 

























FF is determined by its utility function (Equations (3.14) and (3.15)). Equation 
(3.16) can be further simplified to: 
 
B90 = W 230, 230 = z{|}z{|} + z{|} = 11 + z{|}è{|} = 11 + zê| áà}èáà} 	 (3.43) 
 
From Equation (3.43), we see that the probability B90 for a given !!0 to 
be selected by 829 is determined by !!0’s price advantage 230 − 230  over its 
competitor !!0, as well as the shipper’s price sensitivity L9. Price sensitivity 
measures how the price quoted by a FF affects the utility of a given shipper: a 
larger L9  makes a shipper more sensitive to price differences between two 
competing FFs. K9 represents a given shipper’s intrinsic level of satisfaction 
when the price equals to zero. As it does not appear in Equation (3.43), it can be 
set to any arbitrary value. 
Section 3.4.1 presents solutions to the equilibrium pricing decision by 
FFs. Shippers are modeled as having either a high or low level of price 
sensitivity (P-S), and we name them as “high P-S shipper” or “low P-S shipper” 
respectively. The examples are examined with respect to three combinations of 
shippers: 1) both high P-S shippers; 2) a combination of a high P-S shipper and 
a low P-S shipper; 3) both low P-S shippers.  
The effect of price sensitivity L9 on FFs’ equilibrium pricing decisions 
is discussed in Section 3.4.2. How the level of demand of shippers will affect 




FFs’ equilibrium pricing decisions is discussed in Section 3.4.3.  
 
3.4.1 Solution of Equilibrium Pricing Decision Model 
The aim of this section is to examine the equilibrium pricing decision by FFs 
when shippers have different level of price sensitivity. Shippers’ and carriers’ 
parameters are listed in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 Model parameters for Shipper and carrier 
Expt. 
Shipper 829 P-S L9 K9 <9 
1 
82\ H 0.050 
K\ = 0.9 Kd = 0.8 <\ = 250 <d = 200 
82d H 0.060 
2 
82\ H 0.050 82d L 0.006 
3 
82\ L 0.005 82d L 0.006 
 
	
3.4.1.1 Subgame 2 – Interaction between FFs and Cs 
In subgame 2, FFs need to split the cargo among the carriers by referring to the 
pricing scheme of carriers (Table 3.3). To do so, each FF needs to estimate the 
potential cost associated with the different scenarios listed in Table 3.1. As 
discussed in Section 3.3.2.1, the optimal cargo split can be obtained by solving 
the optimization problem given by Equations (3.1) to (3.4). Its solution yields 




the potential costs that occur under different scenarios, as shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 Potential costs for different scenarios in subgame 2 
Scenario 5 Cargo volume !!\ Cargo volume !!d Average unit cost !!\ Average unit cost !!d 
1 <\ + <d = 450 0 ì\\ = 498.33 NA. 
2 0 <\ + <d = 450 NA. ìdd = 498.33 
3 <\ = 250 <d = 200 ìt\ = 500.00 ìtd = 540.00 
4 <d = 200 <\ = 250 ìÅ\ = 540.00 ìÅd = 500.00 
	
3.4.1.2 Sub-game 1 - Interaction between FFs and SPs  
After solving sub-game-2, FFs need to formulate their proposed charges to 
shippers. In sub-game-1, a shipper’s price sensitivity will directly influence the 
price a FF proposes. The pricing decision of both FFs are derived by Equations 
(3.30) and (3.33). We cannot obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium 
price by solving (3.35). However, we could use a non-linear programing 
algorithm to find a solution. The equilibrium prices obtained under the 
combinations of shippers are solved using the optimization toolbox in Matlab 
which uses a dogleg trust-region algorithm for solving a system of nonlinear 
equations (Matlab, 2015); the results are shown in Table 3.5. In the equilibrium 
condition, both FFs propose the same price, obtain the same unit cargo cost, unit 
cargo profit, and get the same expected volume. Table 3.5 also suggests that the 
higher the price sensitivity of the shipper, the lower will be the equilibrium price 




and expected unit profit even though the expected unit cost and total cargo 
volume remain the same. 
 
Table 3.5 Equilibrium price for !!\&!!d 
Expt.. 










1 High, High 536.35 
508.05 225.00 
28.46 
2 High, Low 551.01 43.12 
3 Low, Low 866.96 359.07 
 
3.4.2 Effect of Price Sensitivity on Equilibrium Price  
The aim of this section to investigate the effect of shippers’ price sensitivity on 
the equilibrium price by FFs. An experiment was conducted in which the price 
sensitivity of the shipper, L9 was varied between [0.005, 0.05]. L9 was varied 
within the above range because we would like to see how the variation of price 
sensitivity will affected the equilibrium price and pricing performance of 
different FFs. Both shippers are assumed to have the same price sensitivity.  
The equilibrium price – price sensitivity curve plotted in Fig.4.1 shows 
that there is an inverse relationship between equilibrium price and price 
sensitivity. In addition, this relationship is non-linear. Fig.4.1 also shows that 
there are three distinct parts of the curve. Furthermore, both FFs achieve the 
same level of unit cost (SGD 508.05) and cargo volume (225 TEUs) at the 
equilibrium, and the total demand is split equally between FFs. 




The practical significance of the above findings is that FFs should be 
sensitive to the price sensitivity of their clients. This brings an incentive for FFs 
to price segment their clients. Price segmentation, also known as price 
discrimination in economics, is charging different customers different prices for 
an otherwise identical or similar product (Nagle et al., 2011).  Lower prices 
prevent high price sensitive shippers from switching service providers, but a 
desired profit margin should still be maintained by FFs. It is vice versa when 
FFs interact with high price sensitive shippers - good value-added services and 
level of service should be provided. Through consultation with industry 
practitioners, we also found that the key clients, shippers with large and regular 
demand for cargo movement, seldom switch logistics service providers. They 
try to avoid switching costs and the need to get used to a new business partner. 
They examine price, level of service, and previous experiences to decide 
whether to sign a long term contract or not. On the other hand, small or 
individual clients, shippers with low and infrequent demand for cargo 
movement, switch logistics service providers quite often because they believe 
these service providers offer a similar level of service. They are more sensitive 
to the price they are going to pay, and are willing to switch to a new service 
provider as long as a better price can be obtained.  
However, it is not possible to determine the value of this willingness-to-
pay – L9  except from past transactions or on a trial and error basis. By 
evaluating their previous transactions, FFs can quantify each shipper’s price 




sensitivity. Surveys can also be conducted but the results would have to be 
treated with a fair amount of scepticism because other shippers may not be 
willing to reveal confidential information – e.g. the basis of choosing preferred 
FFs.   
 
 
Fig. 3.5 Effect of price sensitivity on equilibrium price 
 
3.4.3 Effect of Demand on Equilibrium Price 
The aim of this section is to investigate how the level of demand from shippers 




























demand was varied from 0 TEU to 600 TEUs, and the demand was split equally 
between both shippers. The demand is assumed to vary within the above range 
because the total capacity offered by carriers is 600TEUs in the market and the 
market is assumed to be oversupplied. As the purpose of conducting the 
experiment is to examine how the variation of demand will affect equilibrium 
price and other performance indicators, both shippers’ value of price sensitivity 
(set to 0.03). The parameters for the carriers remain unchanged as shown in 
Table 3.3.  
Fig. 3.6 plots equilibrium price (per unit cargo) and unit cargo cost 
against total demand. The figure shows that both the price curve and the cost 
curve consist of three segments and the transitions happen at two critical cargo 
volumes - 167 TEUs and 300 TEUs. When the volume is 167 TEUs, FFs’ 
preference for the preferred carrier shifts from ,d to ,\. This corresponds to the 
breakeven point between the carriers’ charging schemes shown in Fig. 3.7. 
When the demand goes beyond 300 TEUs, this is beyond the capacity of either 
carrier.  
Both the price curve and the cost curve decrease as the volume of 
demand increases from 0 to 300 TEUs. This is because both carriers offer 
volume discounts and FFs enjoy higher discounts as they offer more cargo to 
the carriers. Starting at a volume of 167 TEUs, the price curve and the cost curve 
drops more dramatically because of the differences in the carriers’ charging 
scheme – ,\ uses a low price for a large amount of cargo although the price for 




a small amount of cargo is relatively higher (vice versa for the ,d ). This 
difference between carriers causes the difference in the slope of the cost curve 
and the price curve. When the volume of demand goes beyond 300 TEUs, the 
two curves rise in the beginning to reach a maximum before decreasing 
thereafter. This is because once the total demand exceeds the capacity of the 
most cost-effective carrier, FFs have to split their cargo and use the other less 
cost-effective carrier. The cost curve then goes down because the unit cost is 
calculated as the expected cost with respect to four possible scenarios shown in 
Table 3.1. The cost goes up in scenarios 1 and 2 but falls in scenarios 3 and 4. 
The probability-weighted effect on costs in these four scenarios drives the 
expected cost down as total demand increases. The slops of the cost curve in 
turn affect the price curve. However, the peaks of the two curves are not at the 
same volume of demand. 
 





Fig. 3.6 Equilibrium unit price vs. unit cost 
 



















































Fig. 3.8 plots equilibrium unit cargo profit against demand, whilst Fig. 
3.9 plots equilibrium markup against demand. They show that in order to 
maximize the expected total profit, FFs do not apply the same markup as the 
demand changes. The markup and the profit are determined by the objective of 
maximizing the total expected profit. FFs apply higher markups when the 
volume is very low or very high and decrease their markup as the demand 
become closer to the capacity of the individual carriers – 300 TEUs. 
The implication to the FFs is that the markup should not be identical for 
all market conditions and demand levels. They should determine the optimal 
markup with respect to their current demand level and expected cost.  
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Fig. 3.9 Equilibrium markup 
 
Fig. 3.10 plots total revenue and total cost against demand, whilst Fig. 
3.11 plots total profit against demand. Total revenue and total cost keep 
increasing as demand increases; however, total profit first increases till demand 
reaches 200 TEUs and then drops a bit until demand reaches 300 TEUs. Beyond 
that, total profit keeps growing. This is because the objective of FFs is to 
maximize the expected profit given current demand level and carriers’ charging 
schemes. The growth or loss of total profit is the outcome of balancing price, 
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demand as the growth of marginal revenue is greater than that of marginal cost, 
and vice versa when total profit drops. Specifically, in this experiment, as 
demand increases from 0 TEU to 200 TEUs, FFs can attract more cargo by 
lowering the markup - the marginal profit gained by volume growth is greater 
than that lost due to price drop. Similarly, total profit drops as demand increases 
from 200 TEUs to 300 TEUs because of the outcome of balancing price, cost 
and volume so as to maximize profit. Despite a total profit drop, the price is still 
the optimal decision for FFs as deviating from this price leads to more severe 
decrease in total profit. When demand is beyond 300 TEUs, total profit increases 
again because higher markup is used to cover the potential cost boost due to the 
usage of both carriers and the competition for limited capacity from the 
preferred carrier. FFs may have to split cargo among carriers (lose economy of 
scale) or use the less cost-effective one (failure in competition).  
The implication to FFs is that an improvement of pricing performance 
can be achieved by balancing price, cost and volume of cargo for the purpose 
of maximizing total profit. An increase in price improves per unit cargo profit 
but hurts cargo volume growth. In addition, pricing decisions should be profit-
driven rather than cost-driven. However, most logistics companies and literature 
related to FF operation issues focus more on cost reduction only because they 
believe the market rates are already established and the only thing they could 
do is to reduce cost. The shortcomings of cost-driven pricing are obvious - it is 
impossible to determine a product’s unit cost before determining its volume. It 




fails to account for the effect of price on volume of business secured and volume 
on cost, which directly leads to pricing decisions that undermine profits (Nagle 
et al., 2011). The results may be overpricing in weak markets and underpricing 
in strong ones - exactly opposite to a prudent decision. As a result, a FF quoting 
price should ask whether the change in price will result in a change in revenue 
that is more than sufficient to offset a change in total fixed and variable costs. 
 
 









































































Preliminary research on a game theoretic (GT) approach for pricing decisions 
by FFs has been reported in Chapter 3 . There has been very little existing 
research on pricing decisions, especially those by FFs who are the middlemen 
in a service chain involving shippers, FFs, and carriers. The work introduced a 
GT formulation to account for the willingness-to-pay of shippers and 
competition between FFs. It extended the 2-layer game formulation to a 3-layer 
game formulation, and used the concept of Nash equilibrium in an extensive 
form game and backward induction to determine optimal pricing decisions that 
maximize total profit in a decentralized manner. 
However, like other analytical or quantitative analysis approaches, the 
GT approach requires very complex formulation. It also requires complete 
information of the system – e.g. shipper’s willingness-to-pay, the rationality of 
each actor, or carriers’ charging scheme. Although FFs can obtain this 
information by evaluating previous transactions or by conducting surveys, the 
results would have to be treated with a fair amount of scepticism because firms 
may not be willing to reveal such confidential information. Furthermore, the GT 
approach can only examine the interaction between players with similar 




decision making behavior rather than between actors with very different 
behaviors.  
The aim of this chapter is to help a FF formulate its best pricing 
decisions when it has only limited information of the entire system. The 
information that is available to the FF is shown in Fig. 4.1. The FF knows its 
own objective, and can refer to its internal information (profit gain or loss, 
market share gain or loss, and whether quotations are accepted or not) to 
evaluate the performance of its previous actions so that future decisions can be 
improved. About shippers, the FF knows number of shippers and the demand 
of cargo movement. On carriers, this FF knows number of carriers, their full 
freight rate scheme, and capacity. However, the FF has no information on its 
competing FFs, and knows no more information other than mentioned above.       
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) is built to investigate the interaction 
between the three parties so that the performance of each learning approach can 
be examined. Multi-agent simulations are conducted to investigate the 
interactions under various combinations of FFs that learn. This chapter would 
like to answer: 1) whether learning by trial and error can improve pricing 
performance; 2) which is the best learning mechanism; 3) how learning and 
pricing performance can be optimized. The critical parameters that determine 
learning performance as well as the best settings for these parameters are 
investigated as well.  
   





Fig. 4.1 A FF has limited information of the entire system 
 
4.2 Formulation of FF’s Pricing Decision 
The formulation of a FF’s pricing decision is within a context comprised of 
shippers (829, : = 1, . . , î), FFs (!!0, % = 1,… , ï) and carriers (,., 1 = 1,… , ñ) 
interacting over repeated transactions. As shown in Fig. 4.2, the first set of 




interactions occurs between shippers and FFs. Shippers first announce cargo 
volume and requirements to FFs. Then FFs quote charges and propose cargo 
transportation plans after making their pricing decisions. After comparing the 
quotations from all FFs, shippers offer their cargo to a preferred FF. The second 
set of interactions occurs between FFs and carriers. After receiving cargo from 
shippers, FFs consolidate and then split the cargo among carriers based on each 
individual carrier’s pricing scheme and capacity. As shown in Fig. 4.2, learning 
is incorporated into the internal process of a FF: a learning model is first applied 
to examine the performance of decisions made in previous transactions. New 
pricing decisions are made with respect to acquired knowledge and the current 
pricing situation. This process of the FF pricing decision is repeated over many 
transactions in the market.  
 
 





Fig. 4.2 Structure of interaction between shippers, FFs, and carriers 
 
 In order to formulate the charge to quote a shipper, a !!0 can make its 




pricing decisions as follows (as depicted in equation (4.1)): 
• Step 1: estimate the lowest possible unit cargo movement cost that may 
occur by consolidating the cargo from all shippers – consolidated unit 
cost (,/,0);  
• Step 2: respond with a desired unit cargo movement charge 230  to 
shippers by adding a desired markup BI0 to the estimate of the unit cost, 
which is the pricing decision made by !!0. 
 230 = 1 + BI0 ∙ ,/,0	 (4.1) 
 
The first key issue is how to estimate the potential consolidated unit cost 
(,/,0). As FFs make use of existing available carriers in the spot market to earn 
the price difference, they can use the tariff schemes announced by different 
carriers to estimate a lower bound of this cost. The ,/,0  to !!0  can be 
formulated as: 
 
,/,0 = ?!0∗<99 	 (4.2) 
 
Where ?!0 is the total cargo movement cost to !!0 when consolidating 
cargo from all shippers; ?!0∗ is the optimal value of ?!0, which is calculated by 
solving the following optimization model: 









70.. = <99 	 (4.4) 
  
0 ≤ 70. ≤ ,-., 1 = 1,2, … , ñ	 (4.5)		 	
The objective function minimizes the total fees paid to carriers 
(Equation (4.3)). Constraint (4.4) ensures that all cargo from shippers is 
transported. Constraint (4.5) ensures that the volume of cargo assigned to a 
given carrier is not beyond the carrier’s capacity.  
The other issue is how to set up a reasonable markup to recover the cost 
and maximize total profit. This pricing mechanism is called cost-plus pricing: 
the potential cost (,/,0) is estimated first and then a	markup	(BI0)	is	added in. 
Cost-plus pricing has the disadvantage of not being able to determine the unit 
cost if the final price has not been determined in the first place. Cost-plus pricing 
usually fails to account for the effect of price on volume and volume on cost, 




which leads to pricing decisions that undermine profits (Nagle et al., 2011). The 
result may be overpricing in weak markets and underpricing in strong ones - 
exactly the opposite of what is required of a prudent decision. Thus FFs should 
ask whether the change in price will result in a change in revenue that is more 
than sufficient to offset a change in total fixed and variable costs. In order to 
overcome the disadvantages of cost-plus pricing, FFs can make pricing 
decisions by incorporating learning so that a reasonable markup can be learned 
over time. They work on looking for the level of a reasonable markup to 
establish a prudent price. The price is determined in a strategic and profit-driven 
manner so that the profitability is guaranteed. The level of markup is learnt by 
evaluating the FFs’ performance in previous transactions when different pricing 
decisions are made. FFs’ own goals, the market condition, preferences of 
shippers, and the reactions of competitors can be considered when learning the 
markup level. FFs should learn to take actions that lead to the maximal net 
profits or the minimal net profits loss, rather than deal with the problem of 
pricing to cover costs. 
In this research, we will consider three types of FFs: non-learning FFs, 
reinforcement learning (RL) FFs, and FFs learning on “If-Then (IT)” basis. The 
non-learning FFs fix their markup for a given time period with only periodic 
reviews. The other two types of learning are discussed in Sections 4.3.1 and 
4.3.2. 
 




4.3 Pricing decisions incorporating learning  
4.3.1 Reinforcement Learning (RL) 
In this chapter, RL approaches are implemented to help a FF adapt their pricing 
decisions over time. With RL, the FF is able to learn from its performance in 
previous interactions, and then use the knowledge to improve its future 
decisions. 
A FF does not always have a model of the world because it lacks of 
information on what the market state will be after a specific pricing decision is 
made. The market condition is complex, and it is difficult for an individual firm 
to predict the direction of its evolution. In addition, a FF receives only the 
information of cargo volume and requirements from shippers. Then the FF is 
informed on the acceptance or rejection based on quoted price. On the other 
hand, through interacting with other parties, it is possible for a FF to gather 
internal and external information to measure the performance of its previous 
pricing decisions. As a result, the lack of a model of the world can be overcome 
by involving an function ( )', +' , which is used as an evaluation of an action +>  carried in state )> . The choice of the optimal decision is based on the 
following rule: 
 ?∗ )' = +I@i+7Gm 	( )', +'  (4.6) 
 




Where, the function ( )', +'  can be defined as: 
 ( )', +' = i+7Gmno,Gmnp,… I' + UI'[\ + UdI'[d + ⋯  (4.7) 
 
Equation (4.7) maximizes the discounted reward starting from the next 
stage +'[\ rather than the current state +'. Although a FF doesn’t know exactly 
the function of V )', +'  and I', it has to carry out an action +' at the current 
stage )'  anyway. The agent will then know the successor state )'[\ and the 
reward I' that will be received. Through trial and error, the FF is able to learn 
from its experience although it doesn’t know the exactly the functions of V )', +' . The function ( )', +'  of a FF agent can be further expressed as: 
	 ( )', +' = I' + U i+7Gmno,Gmnp,… I'[\ + UI'[d + ⋯= I' + Ui+7Gmno [I'[\ + U i+7Gmnp,Gmnü,… I'[d + ⋯ ]= I' + Ui+7Gmno 	( )'[\, +'[\ 	= I' + Ui+7Gmno 	( V )', +' , +'[\  
(4.8) 
 
Based on Equation (4.8), we know that: 
 (∗ )', +' 	= I' + U(∗ )'[\, +'[\  (4.9) 





As a result, a FF can learn the value of ( ), +  for all possible states ) ∈T and actions + ∈ Rby trial and error. As equation (4.9) can always be satisfied, 
the difference between the estimates of ( )', +'  at two different times can be 
calculated as 
 ∆'= I' + U( )'[\, +'[\ − ( )', +'  (4.10) 
 
Theoretically, if the difference is small enough, we could conclude that 
the estimation is accurate. This is also the key idea of Temporal-Difference (TD). 
TD-learning methods use partial of the difference to update the estimate of ( )', +'  at time H: 
 K I' + U( )'[\, +'[\ − ( )', +' 	 (4.11) 
 
The step-size parameter K ∈ 0,1  influences the rate of learning, and 
determines how much the value of function ( ), +  is updated at each iteration. 
In this research, four RL models are investigated: Action-Value Method, 
Softmax Method, SARSA Method (on-policy TD method), and Q-Learning 
Method (off-policy TD method). The first two methods are non-associative 
learning mechanisms because actions to be taken are not associated with the 
state. The latter two methods are associative learning mechanisms; they are also 




Temporal-Difference (TD) learning methods. The details on the four RL models 
are presented from Section 4.3.1.1 to Section 4.3.1.4. These learning models are 
used by estimating the value of particular functions. By evaluating the functions 
of action, or state-action pairs, we are able to estimate how good it is for a FF 
to be in a given state, or how good it is to perform a given action in a given 
state: 
• Function of action ( + : the mean reward that has been received when 
action + is selected; 
• Function of state-action pairs ( ), + : the expected return starting from 
state ) by taking action +; 
 
4.3.1.1 Action-Value Method 
The performance of a given action + is evaluated by the value of the action (' + . In this research, the action value is defined as the mean reward received 
when that action is selected (at the A>j play, action + has been chosen :G times 
prior to time H, yielding rewards I\, Id, …, I9°): 
 
 (' + = I\ + Id + ⋯+ I9°:G  (4.12) 
 
Then, the action selection rule is to choose in a greedy manner by 
selecting the action with the highest estimated value with a probability of 




1 − 	M , which is called M-greedy method. With a probability of M, a random 
action is selected.  
 
4.3.1.2 Softmax Method 
The action with the highest mean reward is given the highest selection 
probability, and all the other actions are ranked and weighted accordingly. Thus, 
an action a is chosen with a probability of: 
 
BG = z¢m °£z¢m §£•∈¶  (4.13) 
 
Where W is called temperature - higher temperatures cause the actions to 
become more equally preferred. b is an arbitrary action within the action apace R. 
 
 
4.3.1.3 SARSA: an On-Policy TD Method 
SARSA is short for State-Action-Reward-State-Action. The purpose of SARSA 
is to learn the state-action functions Q s, a  for the current decision π for all 
states s and action a . FFs learn the Q s, a  based on the pseudo code shows 
below: 
 




Initialize Q(s,a) and ) arbitrarily 
Repeat (for each analysis period n): 
Choose a based on ) and Q s,a  for all aA and s=s (e.g., ε-greedy) 
Take action a, observe r and the resulting state s’ 
Choose action a’ in state s’ based on Q s,a  for all aA and s=s’ (e.g. 
ε-greedy) 
Update Q s,a  using: Q s,a  ← Q s,a +α[r+γQ s’,a’ -Q s,a ]	
s ← s'; a ← a’ 
Until N is reached 
 
SARSA is an On-policy (decision) method as it attempts to evaluate or 
improve the policy (decision) that is used to generate actions. 
 
4.3.1.4 Q-Learning: an Off-Policy TD Method 
The state-action functions ( ), +  learned is independent of the action being 
followed, which simplifies the learning mechanism and guarantees early 
convergence. FFs learn the ( ), +  based on the pseudo code shows below: 
 
Initialize Q s,a  and s arbitrarily 
Repeat (for each analysis period n) 
Choose a based on ) and Q s,a  for all aA and s=s (e.g., ε-greedy) 
Take action a, observe r, and the resulting state s’ 








Until N is reached 
 
Q-learning is an off-policy method - the policy (decision) used to 
generate an action, called the behavior policy, may in fact be unrelated to the 
policy (decision) that is evaluated and improved, called the estimation policy.  
 
4.3.2 Learning on If-Then (IT) Basis 
If we use a six-player interaction with two actors in each tier (two shippers, two 
FFs and two carriers) as an example, a FF at time H can identify three possible 
states that it may currently be in (shown in Fig. 4.2). This FF can increase or 
decrease current markup by a certain amount, or stick to the current markup in 
the upcoming transactions. 
 
Table 4.1 Possible states for a FF 
Current state Description 
Unfavorable Lost cargo from both shippers in the H − 1 >j iteration 
Acceptable Gained cargo from only one shipper in the H − 1 >j 
iteration 
Favorable Gained cargo from both shippers in the H − 1 >j iteration 
 




We further define parameter +@0 ∈ 0,1   as a FF’s aggressiveness 
associated with its pricing decision. FFs with a higher value for the 
aggressiveness parameter are more likely to lower markup when facing an 
unfavorable or acceptable state, and less likely to increase markup when facing 
a favorable state. +B0 is defined as the unit of markup adjustment by a FF. The 
rules for price adjustments with respect to a given +@0 are: 
• In the favorable state: the probability to increase current markup BI0 by +B0  units equals (1 − +@0 ); whilst the probability to stick to current 
markup BI0 is +@0;  
• In the acceptable state: the probability to stick to the previous markup is 1 − G©}d ; whilst the probability to reduce BI0 by +B0	equals G©}d . 
• In the unfavorable state: the probability to stick to the current markup BI0 is (1 − +@0); whilst the probability to reduce current markup BI0 by +B0	units equals to +@0. 
 
4.4 Multi-Agent System 
A multi-Agent System (MAS) is built to investigate the interaction between 
shippers, FFs and carriers so that the performance of learning approaches 
proposed in Section 4.3 as well as their best settings for parameters can be 
examined. In the MAS, each player is represented as an intelligent agent. An 
agent is an entity which can perceive the environment and then reacts 




accordingly. The MAS is built from the bottom up by defining the behavior of 
each agent. Different agents are then put in an environment and allowed to 
interact. The performance of each agent as well as the behavior of the whole 
system will emerge out of the individual interactions.  
The decision making procedure of an individual agent is represented by 
a statechart which is a visual construct that enables us to define event- and time-
driven behavior of various agents (Borshchev, 2013). The statechart usually 
consists of states and transitions: a state is the “concentrated history” of the 
agent and also as a set of reactions to external events that determine the agent’s 
future. A transition between states is triggered by a message, a condition, or a 
timeout, which also defines the reactions in a particular state or those when 
entering or existing a given state. When a transition is taken, the state may 
change and a new set of reactions may become active. State transitions are 
atomic and instantaneous. 
MAS offers another way of looking at the whole system comprised of 
shippers, FFs, and carriers: we may not know how the system behaves as, what 
the key variables are and the dependencies between them, but we may have 
some insight into how agents in the system behave individually. We start 
building the model from the bottom up by identifying agents and defining their 
behaviors. Agents are connected to each other in an environment which may 
have its own dynamics (e.g. fluctuating level of demand or supply) and allowed 
to interact. The global behavior of the system emerges out of many individual 




behaviors that interact. An examination of the simulation results under different 
scenarios could help FFs improve their pricing decisions in future transactions. 
 
4.4.1 Shipper Agent 
The behavior of an individual shipper agent is defined by the statechart shown 
in Fig. 4.3. This shipper agent is first in the original state (“idle” state) if there 
is no cargo to be transported. Transition “A\” is triggered once a demand of 
cargo movement is generated (the volume of cargo at hand is no longer zero). 
When exiting the “idle” state, the shipper agent sends solicitations to all FFs, 
and each solicitation comprises the volume of cargo. After sending the service 
request to all available FFs, the shipper agent enters the “requestsSent” state and 
waits for the responses from all contacted FFs. The shipper agent leaves the 
“requestsSent” state on 1) receiving quotations from all contacted FFs 
(transition “At” is triggered); or 2) receiving responses from at least one FFs 
(but not all FFs) but is no longer willing to wait for any further quotations 
(transition “ Ad ” is triggered). Before entering the “FF_selected” state, the 
shipper agent selects one FF by comparing all the received quotations. Each 
shipper agent has its own selection procedure, and these procedures may vary 
among different shippers. A shipper agent may rank all the received quotations 
with respect to its goals and expectations, and then make a decision. It may also 
use optimization procedure to maximize its goals or utility. After selecting the 
preferred FF, the shipper agent enters the “FF_selected” state, and all the cargo 




is delivered to the selected FF. Then the transition “AÅ” is triggered, and the 





Fig. 4.3 Shipper agent’s statechart 
 
4.4.2 FF Agent 
The statechart of a FF agent is divided into two blocks: the first block (Fig. 4.4) 
represents the interaction with shipper agents; the second block (Fig. 4.5) 
represents the interaction with carrier agents.  
In Fig. 4.4, a FF agent starts in the “idle_SP” state if no shipper has 
contacted it for logistics services. Transition “A\” is triggered once the FF 
receives a solicitation from any shipper. After receiving the solicitation, the FF 




leaves the “idle_SP” state and enters the “requestReceived” state. It will start 
estimating the potential cost for the current request. Different FF agents have 
their own way of cost estimate, and they may or may not consider the 
consolidation of the cargo from different shippers with the cargo from previous 
transactions that is still being processed. The FF agent performs it cost 
estimation within a specified time interval, and then the transition “Ad ” is 
triggered. The FF agent enters the “costEstimated” state and starts preparing a 
quotation to the shipper. Again, after a given time interval, the FF agent sends 
the quotation back to the shipper. Then transition “At” is triggered, and the 
statechart enters the “quotationSent” state. In the end, the statechart returns to 
the original “idle_SP” state. 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 FF agent’s statechart - interacting with shipper 
 




A FF’s interaction with carriers is represented as the statechart shown in 
Fig. 4.5. A FF agent starts in the “idle_C” state when no cargo needs to be 
processed or assigned to carriers. Transition “A™” is triggered and the statechart 
enters the “cargoToBeSplit” state once new cargo is received from shippers. 
The FF agent waits in this state until there is one or more available carrier that 
can transport the cargo. If there is at least one available carrier, the transition 
“A´” will be triggered. The FF agent leaves the “cargoToBeSplit” state and starts 
designing a cargo split plan by making the best combination of available carriers. 
After finalizing the cargo split plan, the FF agent will send the request to each 
selected carrier individually. Different FF agents may have different 
considerations or goals when they design their cargo split plans. After all the 
requests are sent, the FF agent enters the “splitRequestsSent” state and will be 
waiting for confirmation from all carriers contacted. The transition “A¨” will be 
triggered if all the requests to carriers have been responded (either accepted or 
rejected). Otherwise, the transition “A≠” is triggered if the FF agent received 
response from at least one carrier (but not all contacted carriers). After leaving 
the “splitRequestsSent” state, the FF agent will assign cargo to carriers. The 
statechart then enters the “requestsConfirmed” state. If there is still remaining 
cargo or new cargo has been received from shippers, transition “AÆ” will be 
triggered, and the statechart goes to the “cargoToBeSplit” state; otherwise 
transition “A\h” will be triggered and the statechart will return to the originating 
state – “idle_C” state. 





Fig. 4.5 FF agent’s statechart - interacting with carrier 
 
4.4.3 Carrier Agent 
The statechart of a carrier agent is depicted in Fig. 4.6. The originating state is 
the “available” state in which the carrier agent becomes available to transport 
cargo physically for one or more FFs. Transition “A\” is triggered if there is at 
least one request received from FFs. The statechart then enters the 
“requestGathering” state in which the carrier agent will waits to collect further 
requests before making a decision regarding which FF to serve. Transition “Ad” 
is triggered if all FFs canceled their requests, and the statechart will then go 
back the originating “available” state. Transition “At” is triggered if the carrier 
agent has been in the “requestGathering” state for enough time and is not willing 
to wait any further. After leaving the “requestGathering” state, the carrier agent 
will select one or more requests among all the active requests (requests that have 




been received during the “requestGathering” state but have not been canceled 
by FFs yet). After determining the FFs to be served in the next trip, the carrier 
agent enters the “transporting” state in which the carrier agent transports the 
cargo from the origin to the destination. Transition “AÅ” is triggered if the carrier 
agent’s cargo movement task is completed and the carrier agent is again 
available for the next assignment. 
 
 
Fig. 4.6 Carrier agent’s statechart 
	
4.5 Experiments and Simulations 
The purpose of conducting multi-agent simulation is to investigate whether 
learning from previous transactions can lead to better freight pricing decisions 
for FFs. Which is the best learning mechanism, and how learning and pricing 
performance can be optimized are also questions we would like to answer. The 




critical parameters that determine learning performance as well as the best 
settings for these parameters are investigated as well. By using the multi-agent 
system built in Section 4.4, pricing performance of the learning mechanisms 
proposed in Section 4.3 is examined. Multi-agent simulations are conducted to 
investigate the interactions between various combinations of FFs that learn. The 
pricing decisions that emerge out of multi-agent simulation are also compared 
with those solved by the GT approach presented in Chapter 3 . 
 
4.5.1 Experiment Settings and Assumptions 
The experiments in this chapter are conducted within a similar context as 
Section 3.4. Two shippers want to move containers from city A to city B. Each 
shipper is going to outsource its vehicle movement tasks to a FF. There are two 
FFs in the market, and they are available to both shippers. Two vessels (carriers) 
serve the route from city A to city B, and both FFs are going to make use of 
these two carriers to design their cargo transportation plans. All the other 
features of the three-tier interaction between shippers, FFs, and carriers remain 
unchanged as shown in Fig. 3.3.  
Further in this chapter, the total analysis horizon is divided into P 
analysis periods. Within each period H, FFs first obtain cargo from shippers and 
then split the cargo received among carriers. After the carriers move the cargo 
from the origin to the destination, the simulation time is advanced to time H +1. The previous steps are repeated until the final analysis period P is reached. 




We define all the interactions that happen during the period H  as the H>j 
iteration.  
For each iteration, the two shippers (SP\ & SPd) need to transport V\ =250 TEUs and Vd = 200 TEUs respectively, and the two carriers (C\ & Cd) can 
both provide slots for ca\ = cad = 300  TEUs. 829 	: = 1,2   will 
independently choose one FF by comparing the proposed unit price from the 
two FFs, denoted as  230, (	% = 1,2).  
Within each iteration, the total capacity of both carriers is more than 
enough to meet the demand from both shippers simultaneously - there is 
oversupply in the market. The demand from shippers and the supply from 
carriers are fixed. All carriers are using downward linear pricing schemes, and 
they will prefer the FF with the higher volume of cargo offered. The value of 














Table 4.2 Parameters for carrier agents 
 +.	 C.	 Capacity of ,. Preferred FF Pricing scheme 
Carrier 
1 
800 0.5 300 
FFs with higher cargo 
volume ± = +. −C.7; Carrier 
2 
600 0.3 300 
FFs with higher cargo 
volume 
 
The interaction between the two shippers ( 829, : = 1,2 ), two FFs 
(!!0, % = 1,2 ), and two carriers (,., 1 = 1,2 ) is investigated by conducting 
multi-agent simulations. The goal of each FF is to maximize total profit. The 
markup BI0  of either FF is allowed to vary in the range of 0,30%   in 
increments of 1%. As both FFs are NVOCCs, they will depend on carriers to 
design the cargo movement plans. They have no direct information on the 
pricing decisions made by their rival, or how their rival’s behaviors adapt over 
time other than whether their bids were successful or not. Each FF, at time H, 
can identify three possible states that it may be in before taking further action – 
favorable, acceptable and acceptable states (Table 3.1). The greedy value M is 
set to be 0.05. The +B0 in the if –then model is set to 1%. 
For each combination of FFs, the experiment is run 20 times with each 
run lasting 500 iterations. The performance at a given time H is evaluated using 
the following indicator:  





;≥A+5	BI≥w%A' = 2I≥w%A''\ 	 (4.14) 
 
The reward I' is quantified as the profits earned within iteration H after 
taking action +': 
 I' = 2I≥w%A'	 (4.15) 
 
There is no other interaction between any pair of players other than that 
described, and the influence of long term contracts is not considered for the 
moment. 
 
4.6 Experiment 4a: Effect of RL on Pricing Decision 
The aim of conducting Expt. 4a is to investigate the effect of reinforcement 
learning on FF’s pricing decision. An experiment was conducted where one FF 
agent learned to adjust its markup by executing one of the four RL models 
(“challenger”, designated as !!\), while the other FF used a fixed markup of 
15% (“defender”, designated as !!d). Both shippers prefer the FF who offers 
the lowest price. Settings for carriers remain unchanged as shown in Table 4.2. 
An extensive search was conducted to find the optimal setting for the 
parameters associated with each of the four learning models used by the 




challenger (shown in Table 4.3). The performance (averaged over 20 runs of 
500 iterations each) of the challenger and the defender under the best settings 
of parameters is shown in Fig. 4.7. We conclude that any one of the 
reinforcement learning models helps improve a FF’s pricing performance vis-a-
vis a fixed markup competitor. 
 
Table 4.3 Optimal setting for model parameters (RL vs. non-learning) 
RL model Optimal setting 
Action-value M = 0.05	
Softmax A = 500	
SARSA M = 0.05, K = 0.5, U = 0.05 
Q-learning M = 0.05, K = 0.5, U = 0.05 
 





Fig. 4.7 Pricing performance –RL challenger against ‘no learning’ defender  
 
By examining a particular experimented run (shown in Fig. 4.8), we 
observe that it takes fewer iterations to learn a near optimal action using the 
Softmax model, slightly more iterations via the SARSA or the Q-learning, and 
the most number of iterations by the Action-value model. In the beginning, the 
average profit per iteration is higher for the Softmax model but increases very 
slowly afterwards. On the other hand, although the average profit per iteration 
is lower at the beginning for both SARSA and Q-learning, the profit increases 
significantly after several more iterations. SARSA and Q-learning also help the 
challenger learn an optimal action in a timely manner. 

































































4.7 Experiment 4b: RL Pricing Decision vs. GT Equilibrium 
Pricing Decision 
The aim of conducting Expt. 4b is to compare the optimal pricing decisions 
obtained by using one of the four RL models through multi-agent simulations 
(RL pricing) with those obtained by solving an analytical mode – GT model 
(GT equilibrium pricing). For both MAS and GT approaches, we use the same 
six-player interaction of two shippers, two FFs and two carriers (as introduced 
in Section 4.5.1). Settings for the experiment remain unchanged (as introduced 
in Section 4.5.1) except for the following: 
1) Both shippers make decisions based on the multinomial logit (MNL) 
model, and the selection behavior of a shipper is determined by its utility 
function (described in Section 3.3.2.2).  
2) Both shippers’ price sensitivity varies within 0.005, 0.05 . 
3) The maximum markup of both FFs is allowed to vary in the range of 
[100%,600%]. 
The RL pricing decisions are obtained by running multi-agent 
simulations. Both FFs learn using the same RL model. The discussion in later 
sections will be based on the SARSA method because as shown in Fig. 4.7 there 
is little difference in the pricing performance of these four RL models. In order 
to quantify the performance of RL pricing, the following indicators are 
calculated for each FF at the final iteration P = 500: 
 




6r		¥H%A	BI≥w%A	 = ;≥A+5	BI≥w%A	%H	%AzI+A%≥H	Hµ'g\<≥5¥iz	≥w	D+I@≥	@+%HzF		%H	%AzI+A%≥H	Hµ'g\ 	 (4.16) 
	  
6r	BI%Dz	 = 6zEzH¥z	%H	%AzI+A%≥H	Hµ'g\<≥5¥iz	≥w	D+I@≥	IzDz%EzF		%H	%AzI+A%≥H	Hµ'g\ 	 (4.17) 
	  
6r		¥H%A	D≥)A	 = ;≥A+5	D≥)A	%H	%AzI+A%≥H	Hµ'g\<≥5¥iz	≥w	D+I@≥	@+%HzF		%H	%AzI+A%≥H	Hµ'g\ 	 (4.18) 
	  
6r		i+I:¥B	 = 6r		¥H%A	BI≥w%A6r		¥H%A	D≥)A 	 (4.19) 
	  
6r		E≥5¥iz = <≥5¥iz	≥w	D+I@≥	IzDz%EzF		%H	%AzI+A%≥H	Hµ'g\ P 	 (4.20) 
 
The analytical model refers to the GT approach described in Chapter 3 . 829’s utility when selecting !!0 is defined by its utility function /90 = E90 +M90, where E90 is the systematic  components of /90, and M90 is the random part. 
The deterministic part of /90 is defined as E90 = K9 − L9230, where 230 is the 
pricing decision of !!0, and K9 and L9 are positive constants associated with 829’s tastes when selecting a preferred FF. L9 reflects 829’s sensitivity towards 
price. Both shippers are assumed to have the same price sensitivity (L9 = L9). 




The GT equilibrium pricing decisions are the best options for both FFs given 
the information they possess. No one has the incentive to deviate from the 
current situation because deviation will not make them better off. 
 
4.7.1 Effect of Price Sensitivity and Action Space on Pricing Decision 
This section examines the effect of shippers’ price sensitivity and FFs’ action 
space on the pricing decisions by FFs. Fig. 4.9 plots the RL unit profit and the 
GT equilibrium unit profit against shippers’ price sensitivity, which confirms 
that there is an inverse relationship between unit profit and shippers’ price 
sensitivity. An inverse relationship can be found between: 1) markup and price 
sensitivity (Fig. 4.10) and 2) price and price sensitivity (Fig. 4.11). As a result, 
a FF can be better off by proposing charges with respect to the price sensitivity 
of clients.  
In addition, a FF’s action space will affect the RL unit profit learned 
through the interactions (Fig. 4.9). The larger the action space is the further the 
RL unit profit will be from the GT equilibrium unit profit because a larger action 
space requires more actions to be evaluated before a FF can find the optimal 
price. As RL is conducted on a trial and error basis, there are more actions to 
evaluate if the maximum markup is larger (600%) compared with the situation 
when the maximum markup is limited (100%). Similar conclusions can be 
obtained by examining the RL markup (Fig. 4.10) and RL price (Fig. 4.11). 






















































































Fig. 4.11 Unit cargo price - RL (SARSA) & GT approach 
 
4.7.2 Effect of Number of Iterations and Level of Information on Pricing 
Decision 
This section examines the effect of number of iterations and FFs’ level of 
information on the pricing decisions by FFs. Fig. 4.12 plots RL price obtained 
after 500 and 5000 iterations when the maximum markup is 600%, which 
confirms that the RL price is below the maximum possible price (the price 



































the GT equilibrium price throughout all simulations. More specifically, the RL 
price curve is always between the expected random price curve (the expected 
price if a FF randomly chooses one price within its action space) and the GT 
equilibrium price curve. This is because the GT equilibrium price is optimal 
given that a FF has the complete information of the whole system (shippers’ 
utility function, carriers’ decision making procedure, and how each player 
interacts with the other). The expected random price is formulated when a FF 
knows nothing about the system – the FF randomly chooses one markup from 
its action space. For the RL price, a FF has limited information – whether 
quotations are accepted, profit and market share gain etc.. Furthermore, the 
more iterations it takes, the closer the RL price converges to the GT equilibrium 
price - the RL price achieved after 5000 iterations is closer to the GT equilibrium 
price than that obtained after 500 iterations.  
When the allowable markup is significantly decreased from 600% (Fig. 
4.12) to 100% (Fig. 4.13), the RL price still does not reach the GT equilibrium 
price no matter how many more iterations are run. These two figures also show 
that the difference between the RL price and the GT equilibrium price grows 
with respect to shippers’ price sensitivity.  
The results suggest that a FF should be aware of how the level of 
information and number of iterations will affect the pricing performance of 
competitors and itself so that an optimal decision can be obtained after as fewer 
interactions as possible. 
















































Fig. 4.13 RL price (maximum markup 100%) vs. GT equilibrium price 
 
4.7.3 Effect of Price Sensitivity on Unit Cargo Cost  
This section examines the effect of shippers’ price sensitivity on FFs’ unit cargo 
cost. The GT equilibrium unit cost, the RL unit cost (equation (4.18)), and the 
lowest possible unit cost are plotted in Fig. 4.14. The lowest possible unit cost 
is calculated by consolidating all cargo from shippers. First of all, the RL unit 
cost curves are all above the lowest possible per unit cost and below the GT 











































closer the RL unit cost converges to the lowest possible per unit cost; while the 
less price sensitive the shippers are, the closer the RL unit cost is to the GT 
equilibrium unit cost. This is because when shippers are price sensitive, the FF 
who offers the lower price is more likely to obtain cargo from both shippers. 
This FF can make use of the economy of scale, and the cost converges to the 
lowest possible. When shippers are less price sensitive, the RL unit cost 
approaches the GT unit cost. The latter is higher than all RL units costs 
established, and much higher than the lowest consolidated cost. GT equilibrium 
unit cost are therefore not the lowest, and shippers can benefit from competition. 
The investigation of these different measures of cost is critical for FFs’ 
practical operations because these costs are the basis on which FFs formulate 
charges or learn an optimal markup. FFs can also know the effect of their action 
space, demand level, and shippers’ price sensitivity on the potential cost so that 
a better estimate of the operating cost can be made.  
 





Fig. 4.14 Unit cargo cost - MAS (SARSA) & GT approach 
 
4.7.4 Effect of Price Sensitivity on Volume of Cargo Obtained 
This section examines the effect of shippers’ price sensitivity on FFs’ volume of 
cargo obtained. Fig. 4.15 shows the MAS equilibrium cargo volume (equation 
(4.20)) and the GT equilibrium cargo volume. We conclude that the MAS 
equilibrium volume matches the game theoretic equilibrium cargo volume, 






































equilibrium cargo volume without any definite trend with regards to the price 
sensitivity of shippers or the FF’s action space. 
 
 
Fig. 4.15 Average cargo volume - MAS (SARSA) & GT approach 
 
4.7.5 Effect of level of Competition Intensity on Pricing Performance 
This section examines the effect of level of competition on FFs’ pricing 
performance. Two forces intensify the level of competition in the market from 


































intensity of competition, V-Force) and competitors’ high intelligence 
(horizontal force on the intensity of competition, H-Force).  
The V-force of a FF is caused by its vertical interactions with shippers: 
if shippers are more sensitive on price, the FF have to quote lower prices so as 
to beat competitors and secure cargo. Thus, the level of competition in the 
market will be more intensive if the V-force is higher. As the V-force makes 
shippers more sensitive regarding price, FFs have to quote a lower price so as 
to beat competitors and secure cargo.  
The H-force of a FF is caused by its horizontal competition with 
competing FFs. Competitors’ high intelligence makes competitors learn and 
adapt very quickly so that the FF will not prevail in competition all the time. 
Thus, the level of competition in the market will be more intensive is the H force 
is higher. The H-force makes competitors learn and adapt very quickly so that a 
particular FF will not prevail in competition all the time. 
Fig. 4.9 shows that the V-Force undermines RL unit profit earned by FFs 
– there is inverse relationship between shippers’ price sensitivity and unit profit. 
On the other hand, the H-Force in this research is determined by FFs’ action 
space – a smaller action space makes FFs learn faster and thus appear to be more 
intelligent. FFs using RL learn and respond faster when the maximum allowable 
markup is 100% compare with the situation when this markup is 600%. Fig. 4.9 
shows the H-F also drives down the RL unit profit earned by FFs – there is an 
inverse relationship between unit profit and maximum allowable markup. 




Similar conclusions can be drawn when we examine RL markup (Fig. 4.10) and 
RL price (Fig. 4.11). The above discussion indicates that a high intensity of 
competition undermines pricing performance of FFs but benefits shippers. In 
Fig. 4.16, the poor pricing performance of if-then FF and Softmax FF is also 
because of the high intensity of competition: both FFs learn very efficiently. Fig. 
4.14 shows that the intensity of competition has two effects on FFs’ unit cost. 
The V-Force drives down unit cost to the consolidated price, while the H-Force 
increases unit cost to the GT equilibrium cost. The former makes a FF more 
likely to gain all the cargo from shippers, while the latter makes two equally 
competitors match each other more quickly and thus split cargo and profit 
evenly. The discussions show that the intensity of competition has two effects 
on FFs’ cost: 1) the V-Force benefits FFs but undermines carriers’ revenue; 2) 
the H-Force increases the cost of FFs but carriers can benefit from it.  
 
4.8 Experiment 4c: If-then Pricing Decision vs. RL Pricing 
Decision 
The aim of this experiment is to compare the learning performance of if then 
learning and RL learning. An experiment was conducted where the defender 
adapted its markup by executing one of the four RL models, while the challenger 
adjusted its pricing decision on an if-then basis. The optimal settings for the 
learning models are determined as follows. First, the defender executes one of 
the RL models using the optimal parameter settings determined in Section 4.6. 




The challenger does an extensive search to determine the best aggressiveness ag∑   setting for if-then learning against the defender. Then, given this 
aggressiveness setting for the challenger, the defender does an extensive search 
of its parameter setting for the RL model it is using. This procedure is repeated 
until a Nash equilibrium is reached (shown in Table 4.4): the defender’s and 
challenger’s parameter settings are all the best responses to each other, and none 
of them can do better by unilaterally deviating from the optimal settings.  
The performance of the challenger and the defender under such 
condition is shown in Fig. 4.16. Learning on an if-then basis gives better 
performance than any of the four RL models. Thus, RL does not always perform 
well in competition with other FFs. 
A possible reason could be that we currently define state in terms of the 
number of shippers whose cargo was successfully acquired in the latest 
transaction. We have not yet incorporated other relevant information (for 
example, previous price level, demand and supply level) to determine the 
current state. In addition, the action space for RL (markup ∈ 0,30%  , 31 
possible actions) is larger compared with that of the ‘if-then’ learning (only 3 
possible actions). In other words, it takes fewer iterations for the ‘if-then’ 
learning to explore the entire action apace to identify a better action for the 
current state. As a result, the “if-then” learning is more responsive to the changes 
of its rivals and the environment. If more criteria are incorporated to amplify 
the number of states and simplify the action space, the performance of RL could 




be improved significantly.  
 
Table 4.4 Optimal setting for model parameters (If-then vs. RL) 
challenger (if-then) Defender (RL) +@0 = 0.70	 Action-value, ε=0.05 +@0 = 0.85	 softmax,	W = 500 +@0 = 0.80	 SARSA, K = 1, U = 0.05 +@0 = 0.80	 Q-learning, K = 0.30, U = 0.05 
 
 
Fig. 4.16  Pricing performance –IT against RL 





4.9 Experiment 4d: How Aggressive Should a FF Be on Pricing? 
The aim of this experiment is to investigate how aggressive should a FF be in 
pricing. An experiment was conducted where both challenger and defender 
learned on an if-then basis. An extensive search was first conducted to find the 
optimal settings for the parameters associated with both FFs. As both FFs are 
symmetric in behavior, they are denoted as !!0 and !!0 respectively.  
Fig. 4.17 shows the total profit earned by !!0  and !!0  given the 
aggressiveness +@0 of the other !!0. For each setting of +@0 for !!0, !!0 has an 
optimal response ( +@0∗ G©} ). When competing with FFs with lower 
aggressiveness, a FF can be better off by being more aggressive. Moreover, the 
general level of a FF’s profitability is affected by its components’ 
aggressiveness, and this aggressiveness determines the intensity of the 
competition in the market. More intensive competition will drive down profit 
for both actors 
By plotting the optimal +@0∗ against +@0, we obtain the frontier depicted 
in Fig. 4.18. This frontier represents the reaction curve of !!0 given the action 
taken by !!0. In order to find the equilibrium aggressiveness of both FFs, we 
need to find the interaction of the reaction curve of !!0 and !!0 . Due to the 
symmetric behavior of both FFs, the reaction curve of !!0 given the action 
taken by !!0 should be the same as the frontier shown in Fig. 4.18. Thus this 




curve also yields the equilibrium frontier for both FFs. Each point on the frontier 
is a Nash Equilibrium because the action of each FF is already the best response 
to that of the other. By referring to this curve, a FF can figure out its optimal 
aggressiveness when competing against competitors. 
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CHAPTER 5  PRICING DECISIONS WITH REAL 
WORLD ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION 
	
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to help a FF make pricing decisions based on the 
information that is accessible to the FF in the real world operations. This chapter 
extends the learning approaches discussed in Chapter 4 by applying them in a 
different pricing situation: FFs are able to learn but only with the information 
that is available to them in reality.  
The information that is available to a FF is shown in Fig. 5.1. The FF 
knows its own objectives, and can refer to its internal information (profit gain 
or loss, market share gain or loss, and whether quotations are accepted or not) 
and external information to update its pricing decisions over time. For the 
external information, the FF knows:1) number of shippers and each individual 
shipper’s demand of cargo movement; 2) number of carriers. However, the FF 
does not know carriers’ full freight rate scheme and available capacity. Instead, 
the FF each time announces cargo volume and requirements to carriers after 
formulating its own cargo split plan. The FF will seek for confirmations from 
carriers and redo cargo split until all cargo is assigned and transported. The FF 
has no information on its competing FFs, and knows no more information other 
than mentioned above.         






Fig. 5.1 Information that is accessible to a FF in real world operations 
 
In this chapter, the three-tier interaction between shippers, FFs, and 
carriers is examined when there are multiple players in each tier. Multi-agent 
simulations are conducted to get deeper insights into a FF’s pricing decisions 
that are not well captured by the approaches proposed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4 : we examine the scenarios when the demand from shippers and the supply 




offered by carriers are allowed to fluctuate. Although a FF cannot control the 
fluctuation of demand and supply, the FF is able to adjust its pricing decisions 
to react to the fluctuation. In addition, although the market is assumed to be over 
supply over the long horizon, for a short time there may be insufficient supply. 
The simulation conducted in this chapter also takes into account undersupply in 
the market.  
The synchronous time model adopted in Chapter 4  (everything happens 
within a time step n and then the time jumps to the next time step n+1) is also 
relaxed in this chapter: by assuming asynchronous time model, activity and 
events can happen at any time point. According to (Borshchev, 2013), 
asynchronous time assumes that there is no “grid” on time axis and events may 
occur at arbitrary moments, exactly when they are to occur. In this way, the 
simulation can be conducted in a more realistic manner.  
 
5.2 Research context 
In this chapter, we examine the interaction between shippers, FFs, and carriers 
with multiple actors in each tier. As shown in Fig. 5.2, how a FF is able to make 
optimal pricing decisions is investigated in a context comprised of î shippers 
(829, : = 1,2, … , î ), ï  freight forwarders (!!0, % = 1,2, … , ï ) and ñ  carriers 
(,., 1 = 1,2, … , ñ). All shippers need to transport cargo between the same origin 
and destination pair. An individual 829 needs to transport <9 unit of cargo. 
There are multiple carriers in the market, and they are available to all FFs. 






Fig. 5.2 The Three-tier interaction with multiple players in each tier 
 
The demand comes from shippers, which is supposed to be satisfied by 
the supply offered by carriers. On the supply side, the market is assumed 
oversupplied: the total supply offered by carriers is greater than the demand for 
cargo movement. However, for a short period, there can be under supply in the 
market. We also assume that the demand of cargo movement and the supply 
offered by carriers may fluctuate. Carriers may adjust their fleet size in response 
to the changes in demand, but how to adjust fleet size is not the focus of this 
research. We adopt the above assumptions because the emphasis of the research 




is on pricing decisions by FFs in a competitive oversupplied market. The aim of 
this research is to assist a FF to identify a pricing decision via the interaction 
with other actors, given the demand from shippers and the supply from carriers. 
The FF assures its own profitability as long as it can beat its competitors. 
We would like to assist a given FF (!!\ in Fig. 5.2) in its pricing 
decisions via the interaction with other actors. How shippers, FFs, and carriers 
interact with each other is already presented in Fig. 5.2. From the FF’s 
perspective, it does not know the full information of the entire system. The FF 
only knows: 1) demand of cargo movement from shippers; 2) whether 
quotations are accepted or not; 3) number of available carriers in the market; 4) 
price quoted by carriers and volume of cargo that can be accepted by each carrier 
after each solicitation; 5) internal information, for example, profit gain or loss, 
market share improvement or loss etc.  
The vertical interaction between shippers and FFs as well as that 
between FFs and carriers are considered. The first stage of the vertical 
interaction happens between shippers and FFs. Each shipper can have its own 
goal, and the goal of different shippers can very from each other. All shippers 
are outsourcing shippers, and they all independently choose one preferred FF 
based on proposed charges. The demand of each shipper is allowed to vary. 
Shippers have no incentive to split their cargo between FFs because outsourcing 
by shippers is common in the real world operations. Most of the shippers do not 
want to design and execute their own cargo movement plans. Instead, they 




prefer to partner third party logistics companies and rid themselves of non-core 
services and additional functions that are not typical for a company. All FFs are 
assumed to be NVOCCs, and each FF can have its own goals which may very 
across different FFs. No FFs have the incentive to cooperate with others; instead, 
they compete for limited cargo from shippers and available capacity from 
carriers. Communication and information exchange are not possible between 
FFs, and they do not form a coalition.  
The second stage of the vertical interaction happens between FFs and 
carriers. Each FF aims at achieving its own goals by splitting cargo among 
available carriers. Each FF can have its own goals and the objective of different 
FFs may vary. Each carrier does not reveal its full freight rate scheme and 
available capacity to FFs. Each time a FF sends a solicitation (including cargo 
volume, requirements etc.) to a specific carrier, and the carrier only responses 
unit cargo movement charge and volume of cargo that can be accepted. This 
procedure repeats until all cargo from the FF is assigned. In the end, carriers 
transport cargo physically from the origin to the destination. Each carrier is 
allowed to vary its fleet size and can have its own objective and ways of 
adjusting freight rate scheme. However, how carriers adjust their pricing 
schemes and fleet size is not the focus of this research. 
 Horizontal competitions within tiers are also considered. FFs compete 
for business from shippers by proposing prices, and compete for the most cost-
effective carriers by splitting cargo among carriers. The competition between 




carriers is taken into account by: 1) carriers’ freight rate scheme; 2) how carriers 
decide which FFs to serve once solicitations from FFs are beyond capacity. The 
competition between shippers is not considered for now.  
This chapter also extends the synchronous time model assumption 
adopted in Chapter 4 by assuming asynchronous time model. According to 
(Borshchev, 2013), asynchronous time model assumes that there is no “grid” on 
time axis and events may occur at arbitrary moments, exactly when they are to 
occur (Fig. 5.3). However, the study in Chapter 4 assumes synchronous time 
model during the interaction between shippers, FFs, and carriers (also during 
multi-agent simulations). Synchronous time assumes that things can only 
happen during discrete time steps (they are “snapped to the time grid”), and 
nothing happens in-between. With the synchronous time model assumption, 
each player performs all its actions or do nothing at time H and then the time 
jump to time H + 1 (Fig. 5.4): both shippers announce volume of cargo to FFs, 
and both FFs make pricing decisions simultaneously and then response 
quotation. All the activities mentioned above occur within one time step, and 
then the time jumps to the next time step.  
 
 





Fig. 5.3 Asynchronous time model 
 
 
Fig. 5.4 Synchronous time model 
 
5.3 Decision Making Model for Each Party 
In reality, each actor can have its own objectives and decision making models. 
This section presents how the behavior and decision making models of one actor 
vary from those of another. How information is exchanged between different 
actors will be discussed from the perspective of a specific shipper (Section 
5.3.1), FF (Section 5.3.2), and carrier (Section  5.3.3).  
	





From a specific shipper’s perspective (829), the information flow between the 
shipper and its integrating FFs is presented in Fig. 5.5. The shipper first 
announces cargo volume and requirements to each FF in the market. Each FF 
then responds its quotation back to the shipper. This shipper will compare all 
received quotations and then select a preferred FF. 
  
	
Fig. 5.5 The information flow between a specific shipper and its interacting 
FFs 
	
In order to take into account variations in shippers’ decision making 
procedure, a specific shipper’s selection behavior for the preferred FF is 
modeled in three ways (shown in Table 5.1):  




A type A shipper does not choose the FF who quotes the highest or the 
lowest price. Instead, the shipper randomly chooses one FF among all the other 
FFs. In reality, when some shippers make decisions, their rationality is limited 
by the availability of information, the tractability of the decision problem, the 
cognitive limitations of their minds, and the time available to make the decision. 
They may just seek a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one.  
 A type B shipper always chooses the FF who quotes the lowest price. In 
reality, some shippers are quite sensitive about shipping cost. They are willing 
to switch to a new service provider as long as a lower price can be achieved. For 
example, when shippers transport less time sensitive cargo, they are willing to 
pay less attention on level of service as long as cargo can be transported from 
the origin to the destination with the lowest shipping cost. 
The objective of a type C shipper is to maximize its utility. When the 
shipper wants to transport cargo from an origin to a destination, there are 
multiple factors affecting its decision. This shipper’s perception and preference 
on various FFs can be measured by its utility function. The alternative that 
brings the highest utility will be selected. For example, we used multi-nominal 









Table 5.1 Variations in shippers’ selection behavior 
Type Selection behavior of preferred FF 
A Bounded rationality 
B Always choose the FF who offers the lowest price 




5.3.2  FFs 
FFs are an intermediary party who facilitates the transactions between shippers 
and carriers in the logistics chain. From a specific FF’s perspective (!!0), the 
information flow between the FF and its integrating shippers is presented Fig. 
5.6. Various shippers first announce volume of cargo and requirements to the 
FF. By consolidating the cargo from all shippers, the FF announces consolidated 
cargo volume and requirements to each available carrier in the market. Each 
carrier then responds unit cargo price and volume of cargo that can be accepted. 
The FF has no information on how each carrier decides quoted price and volume 
of cargo that can be accepted. Based on the above information, the FF makes its 
pricing decision and responds unit cargo price back to each shipper. In the end, 
each shipper decides whether to accept the quotation or not. If a quotation is 
accepted, the shipper will offer all its cargo to the FF.  
 





Fig. 5.6 The information flow between a specific FF and its interacting 
shippers 
	
Similarly, from the FF’s perspective (!!0), the information flow between 
the FF and its integrating carriers is presented Fig. 5.7. After receiving cargo 
from various shippers, the FF needs to further split cargo among available 
carriers so that all the cargo received can be transported from the origin to the 
destination. Once there is remaining cargo to be transported, a FF first 
announces volume of cargo and requirements to all available carriers. Each 
carrier then responds quotation and volume of cargo that can be accepted. After 
comparing all quotations and accepted cargo volume from various carriers, the 
FF decides which carrier to choose. The above procedure repeats until all 
remaining cargo is transported.     
	





Fig. 5.7 The information flow between a specific FF and its interacting carriers 
	
In order to take into account variations in FFs’ behavior and decision 
making models, three types of FFs are considered (shown in Table 5.2).  
A type A FF applies fixed markup and reviews the markup periodically. 
When contacted by a shipper for cargo movement service, the FF first estimates 
potential cost and then responds a quotation by adding in its desired markup. 
The desired markup can be formulated based on the FF’s experience, objectives, 
or other analytical analysis approaches (for example, the game theoretical 
approach proposed in Chapter 3 ). The markup is reviewed periodically by 
examining the FF’s pricing performance in previous transactions. If a high level 
of profit or market share was achieved, this FF will have incentives to increase 
its markup for future transactions. Otherwise, lower markup will be preferred. 




In reality, most FFs behave in this way because they are the intermediary party 
who earns price difference between the revenue gained from shippers and the 
fees paid to carriers. The simplest way of making pricing decision is to add a 
markup to costs so that a certain level of profitability can be achieved.  
A type B FF learns by one of the four RL models proposed in Section 
4.3.1. The FF is able to learn by trial and error so that no training data is required. 
RL learning is easy to implement by only using the information that is available 
to FFs.  
A type C FF learns on if-then basis as presented in Section 4.3.2. This is 
also an intuitive way of learning by trial and error.   
 
Table 5.2 Variations in FFs’ pricing model 
Type Description 
A Apply a fixed markup and review the markup periodically 
B 
Learn the optimal pricing decision by applying one of the four 
RL models proposed in Section 4.3.1. 
• B1: Action value 
• B2: Softmax 
• B3: Sarsa 
• B4: Q-learning 
C Learn on if then basis as presented in Section 4.3.2. 
 




In order to incorporate more criteria to amplify the number of states and 
simplify the action space so as to improve the learning efficiency of RL models, 
in this chapter the sate of a FF is defined in a two dimensional manner (as shown 
in Fig. 5.8): pricing performance (market share) and markup level. From a given 
FF’s perspective, a state is defined with respect to its latest markup level and 
latest market share. The markup of the FF can be at a high level, a medium level, 
or a low level (Fig. 5.9). Within each markup range (for example, high markup 
range), the number of possible markup points is assume to be iB0. It means the 
entire action space of the FF is divided evenly into (3iB0 - 1) segments and the 
boundary of each segment is a possible markup point for the FF. The market 
share associated with a FF can be estimated as the portion or percentage of cargo 
that obtained by the FF with respect to all the cargo requested by shippers (Fig. 
5.10). It can be calculated as the volume of cargo obtained by the FF divided by 
the total volume of cargo requested by all shippers.  
 





Fig. 5.8 States of a FF 
	
	
Fig. 5.9 Markup levels of a FF 
	
	





Fig. 5.10 Define pricing performance of a FF 
	
In this chapter, as the demand and supply are allowed to vary, the best 
pricing decision for a FF may not be the one that brings the highest total profits. 
Higher total profit may be due to higher total demand in the market (for example, 
peak season for cargo movement, like Christmas). Thus, we define the reward 
of !!0 as shown in Equation (5.1): the reward of !!0 is measured by the amount 
of profits gained divided by the highest possible total profit the FF is able to 
earn in the market.  230  is the price decision made by !!0; D≥)A0Gπ>∫G4  is the 
actual cost of !!0  after taking action 230 . T<0Gπ>∫G4  is the actual volume of 
cargo obtained by !!0 . BI%Dz0ºGΩ  is the highest possible price for !!0  when 
quoting price to shippers. ,/,0 is the lowest unit cargo cost for !!0. <99  is 
the total demand for cargo movement from all shippers.   
 
I = 230 − D≥)A0Gπ>∫G4 ;<0Gπ>∫G4(BI%Dz0ºGΩ − ,/,0) <99  (5.1) 
	





From a specific carrier’s perspective (,. ), the information flow between the 
carrier and its integrating FFs is presented in Fig. 5.11. Each FF first announces 
cargo volume and requirements to the carrier. The carrier responds price and 
volume of cargo that can be accepted to each FF. Each FF compares the 
quotations from various carriers, and decides whether accept the carrier’s 
quotation or not. In the end, the carrier confirms the FFs to serve. 
	
	
Fig. 5.11 The information flow between a specific carrier and its interacting 
FFs 
	
In reality, each carrier has its own ways of formulating freight rate 
scheme as well as deciding which FFs to serve when the solicitations received 




are beyond the carrier’s capacity. As the focus of this research is on the pricing 
decisions by FFs, we assume that carriers are able to adjust their freight rate 
scheme but what is the optimal way to do it is not the focus of this study. In 
order to take into account the variations in carriers’ behavior and decision 
making models, we assume that each carrier has its own way of freight rate 
scheme formulation and fleet size adjustment.  
Carriers offer quantity discount to a FF if the FF offers a cargo volume 
that exceeds a certain minimum level. Quantity discount is often used by 
marketers to stimulate higher purchase level. The rational for using quantity 
discount often rests in the cost of product shipment: shipping costs tend to 
decrease per item shipped. Fig. 5.12 presents an example of a carrier’s freight 
rate scheme when the carrier offers quantity discount (Type A carrier). A 
carrier’s freight rate scheme may comprise of multiple break points (Fig. 5.12): 
If cargo volume is less than <≥5¥iz\ , 2I%Dz\ will apply. Similarly, if cargo 
volume is greater than <≥5¥iz\, 2I%Dzd will apply. This carrier can serve up to 
the volume of its capacity. Alternatively, a carrier can offer quantity discount in 
another form (as shown in Fig. 5.13, Type B shipper).   
 





Fig. 5.12 A carrier’s freight rate scheme with quantity discount (Type A) 
	
	
Fig. 5.13 A carrier’s freight rate scheme with quantity discount (Type B) 
	
Although there is oversupply in the market, it is possible for a specific 
carrier to receive multiple solicitations from different FFs. If the total requested 
demand is beyond the capacity of the carrier, the carrier may prefer the FF who 




offers larger volume of cargo (Type C) or the one who offers higher prices (Type 
D). 
	
5.4 MAS Simulation and Experiments 
5.4.1 Experiment Setting and Assumption  
The simulations conducted in this chapter investigates scenarios when there are 
multiple shippers, multiple FFs, and multiple carriers in the market. Multi-agent 
simulations are conducted based on the following case: three shippers want to 
transport containers from city A to city B. Each shipper is going to outsource its 
vehicle movement tasks to a FF. There are multiple FFs in the market, and they 
are available to all shippers. Four vessels (carriers) serve the route from city A 
to city B, and all FFs are going to make use of these four carriers to design their 
cargo transportation plans. The information that is accessible to a specific FF 
has been discussed in Fig. 5.1. All the other features of the three-tier interaction 
has been discussed in Fig. 5.2. 
Four sets of experiments are conducted in this chapter: Experiment 5a, 
5b, 5c, and 5d. The first two sets of experiments (Section 5.4.2) are conducted 
under the synchronous time model assumption. Expt. 5a (Section 5.4.2.1) 
examines the three-tier interaction under the synchronous time model 
assumption with three shippers, two FFs, and four carriers in the market. The 
experiment extends the simulations conducted in Chapter 4 by including more 
actors in in the market. The demand and supply are assumed to be fixed 




throughout the entire simulation horizon. Expt. 5b (Section 5.4.2.2) extends 
Expt. 5a by relaxing the fixed demand and supply assumption. Instead, the 
demand and supply are allowed to vary. The latter two sets of experiments 
(Section 5.4.3) are conducted under the asynchronous time model assumption. 
Expt. 5c (Section 5.4.3.1) extends  Expt. 5b by assuming asynchronous time 
model. Events and activities can occur at any time point. Expt. 5d (Section 
5.4.3.2) extends experiment 5c by including five FFs in the market (adding three 
more FFs into the market). 
	
5.4.2 Synchronous Time Model  
With the synchronous time model assumption, the whole analysis horizon is 
divided into P discrete iterations. Within a specific iteration H (also called time H), all shippers assign cargo among FFs, and all FFs assign cargo among carriers. 
In the end, all the cargo is transported to the destination and the time jumps to H + 1. The above process repeats until the final time P is reached. 
  
5.4.2.1 Experiment 5a: fixed demand and supply with two FFs 
In this experiment, the aim is to investigate the performance of RL models when 
there are multiple shippers and carriers in the market. Whether learning 
performance of RL models can be improved by redefining state and action space 
is also the research question this experiment would like to answer. We extend 
the experiment conducted in Section 4.8 (Expt. 4c) by adding one more shipper 




and two more carriers into the market. The investigation then focuses on  the 
interaction between three shippers (829, : = 1,2,3), two FFs (!!0, % = 1,2), and 
four carriers (,., 1 = 1,2,3,4). How experiments are conducted in this section 
remains unchanged as we did in Expt. 4c (Section 4.8) other than the following 
changes:  
Settings for the three shippers are presented in Table 5.3. Each shipper 
has its own demand of cargo movement and selection behavior for the preferred 
FF. The demand from each shipper is assumed to be fixed throughout the entire 
simulation horizon.  
 
Table 5.3 Settings for shipper agents (Expt. 5a) 
Shipper Type Demand Specifications 82\ B 255 TEUs  82d C 200 TEUs Price sensitivity =0.06; 82t B 225 TEUs  
1) Type A: do not choose the FF who offers the highest or the lowest price; 
instead, randomly choose one FF among all the other FFs;  
2) Type B: prefer the FF who offers the lowest price 
3) Type C: modeled by the multi-nominal logit model (discussed in Section 
3.3.2.2) 
 
Settings for the four carriers are presented in Table 5.4. Two of the 
carriers use liner freight rate scheme and the other two carriers use stepwise 
freight rate scheme. The supply offered by each carrier is assumed to be fixed 




throughout the entire simulation horizon.  
 
Table 5.4 Settings for carrier agents (Expt. 5a) 
Carrier Type Parameters ,\ A+C ± = 800 − 0.57; 	D+B+D%A± = 300	;N/) ,d A+D ± = 600 − 0.37; 	D+B+D%A± = 290	;N/) ,t B+C BI%Dz\ = 750; BI%Dzd = 600; <\ = 125; D+B+D%A± = 310	;N/) ,Å B+D BI%Dz\ = 700; BI%Dzd = 650; <\ = 150; D+B+D%A± = 320	;N/)  
1) Type A: linear pricing scheme 
2) Type B: step-wise pricing scheme 
3) Type C: prefer FFs who offer larger volume of cargo 
4) Type D: prefer FFs who offer higher price   
 
Settings for the two FFs are presented in Table 5.5. Both FFs are able to 
learn: !!\ learns by Q-learning and !!d learns on if then basis. How the action 
space, possible markup points, and state (only for the FF who learns by 










Table 5.5 Settings for FF agents (Expt. 5a) FF	 Type	 Specifications	
!!\	 B4:	Q	learning	
i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	i+I:¥B\ = 100%;	i+I:¥Bd = 200%;	O8\ = 33%;	O8d = 66%;	iB = 3	(9	possible	markup	points	)	
!!d	 C:	If-then	basis	 i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	9	possible	markup	points	(same	as	FF\)	B4:	Q	learning	
C: Learn on if then basis presented in Section 4.3.2. 
 
An extensive search was conducted to find the optimal setting for the 
parameters associated with each FF’s learning model. For each combination of 
setting for parameters, the experiment is run for 20 runs and each run lasts for 
500 simulation time. The best setting for the learning parameters associated with  !!\ and !!d is presented in Table 5.6. The pricing performance (averaged over 
20 runs of 500 simulation time each) of !!\ and !!d under the best setting of 
learning parameters is presented in Fig. 5.14 (total profit) and Fig. 5.15 (total 
volume of cargo obtained). By conducting statistical analysis, 20 simulation 
runs are sufficient and we can conclude that: 
First of all, a FF who learns by reinforcement learning can improve its 
pricing performance by properly defining its states and action space. We 
proposed in Section 4.8 to incorporate more criteria to amplify the number of 




states and to simplify the action space to improve the pricing performance of 
RL learning models. In this chapter, we simplify the action space by using less 
possible markups points and amplify the number of states by defining the state 
with respect to latest pricing performance and latest markup level. In this way, 
the learning performance of RL models improves significantly (!!\ beats  !!d 
in terms of total profits and volume of cargo obtained).   
In addition, although the total profit gained by a FF may vary due to 
variations in the total number of shippers/carriers and their specifications, 
whether a FF is able to achieve its optimal pricing performance is determined 
by its capability to beat competitors via learning. No matter how the market 
condition is, a FF can always assure its profitability as long as efficient learning 
is possible. Compared with Expt. 4c (Section 4.8), although the number and 
settings for shippers/carriers are changed in this experiment, the best setting for 
learning parameters associated with both FFs remains unchanged. As FFs are 
the middle men between shippers and carriers in the logistics market, it may not 
be easy for a FF to influence the general level of demand/supply in the market 
and the behavior of interacting shippers/carriers. However, a FF can adapt its 
decision and react to the changes of the market. In this way, better pricing 
performance can be achieved. 
Furthermore, the total profit earned by each FF is a result of balancing 
revenue, cost, and volume. We examine a specific simulation run under the best 
setting for learning model parameters. The total profit (Fig. 5.18) earned by a 




FF is the difference between its total revenue (Fig. 5.16) and total cost (Fig. 
5.17). On the one hand, although the total profit earned by !!\ is higher than 
that earned by !!d throughout the entire simulation horizon (Fig. 5.18), !!\ 
does not beat !!d in terms of average unit cargo revenue (Fig. 5.21) and average 
unit cargo profit (Fig. 5.22). On the other hand, although the average unit cargo 
cost for both FFs are around the same level (Fig. 5.17), !!\ beats !!d in terms 
of volume (Fig. 5.19)) and market share (Fig. 5.20). As a result, the combination 
effect of unit cargo revenue (price), volume and unit cargo cost makes !!\ earn 
more profit than !!d.  
	
Table 5.6 Test setting for FFs’ learning model parameters (Expt. 5a) 
FF Type Specifications !!\ B4: Q learning K = 0.30, U = 0.05	!!d C: If-then basis +@0 = 0.80	
B4: Q learning 
C: Learn on if then basis presented in Section 4.3.2. 
	





Fig. 5.14 Pricing performance of  !!\ and !!d –total profit earned 
 
	






































Fig. 5.16 Total revenue earned by !!\ and !!d 
	

































Fig. 5.18 Total profit earned by !!\ and !!d 
	









































Fig. 5.20 Market share of !!\ 
	








































Fig. 5.22 Average unit cargo profit of !!\ and !!d 
	










































5.4.2.2 Experiment 5b: flexible demand and supply with two FFs 
In this experiment, the aim is to investigate the performance of RL models when 
demand and supply in the market are allowed to vary. We extend Expt. 5a by 
relaxing the fixed demand and supply assumption. The investigation is still on 
the interaction between three shippers (829, : = 1,2,3), two FFs (!!0, % = 1,2), 
and four carriers (,., 1 = 1,2,3,4), but demand from shippers and supply offered 
by carriers are allowed to vary due to their internal factors. How the demand 
and supply vary with respect to time is not the focus of this research. Instead, 
the focus is on how a given FF is able to respond to changes of the environment 
and reactions from other interacting parties.   
Settings for the three shippers are presented in Table 5.7. Each shipper 
has its own demand for cargo movement and selection behavior for the preferred 
FF. Each shipper’s demand of cargo movement varies with respect to time and 













Table 5.7 Settings for shipper agents (Expt. 5b) 
Shipper Type Demand Demand Specifications 
82\ B ¥H%w≥Ii 250± 40 ;N/) 255 TEUs Lowest price 
82d C ¥H%w≥Ii 200± 40 ;N/) 200 TEUs Price sensitivity =0.06; 
82t B ¥H%w≥Ii 225± 40 ;N/) 225 TEUs Lowest price 
1) Type A: Do not choose the FF who offers the highest or the lowest price; 
Randomly choose one FF among all the other FFs;  
2) Type B: Prefer the FF who offers the Lowest price 
3) Type C: Modeled by the multi-nominal logit model (discussed in Section 
3.3.2.2) 
 
Settings for the four carriers are presented in Table 5.8. The first two 
carriers use liner freight rate scheme and the latter two use stepwise freight rate 
scheme. It is assumed that the capacity of carriers varies with respect to time 
and follows uniform distribution (only discrete values are valid for available 
slots). 
 It is assumed that both FFs are able to learn: !!\ learns by Q-learning 
and !!d learns on if-then basis. Table 5.9 presents how action space, possible 
markup points, and states (only for the FF who learns by reinforcement learning) 
are defined in this experiment.  
 




Table 5.8 Settings for carrier agents (Expt. 5b) 






Table 5.9 Settings for FF agents (Expt. 5b) FF	 Type	 Specifications	
!!\	 B4:	Q	learning	
i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	i+I:¥B\ = 100%;	i+I:¥Bd = 200%;	O8\ = 33%;	O8d = 66%;	iB = 3	(9	possible	markup	points)	
!!d	 C:	If-then	basis	 i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	9	possible	markup	points	(same	as	FF\)	B4:	Q	learning	
C: Learn on if then basis presented in Section 4.3.2. 
	




An extensive search was conducted to find the optimal setting for the 
parameters associated with the learning model associated with each FF. For 
each combination of settings for parameters, the experiment is run for 20 runs 
and each run lasts for 500 iterations. The best setting for the parameters 
associated with each FF is presented in Table 5.10. The pricing performance 
(averaged over 20 runs of 500 iterations each) of !!\ and !!d under the best 
setting for learning parameters is presented in Fig. 5.24 (total profit) and Fig. 
5.25 (total volume of cargo obtained). By conducting statistical analysis, 20 
simulation runs are sufficient and we can conclude that: 
First of all, reinforcement learning helps improve a FF’s pricing 
performance vis-à-vis a FF who learns on if then basis even when demand and 
supply in the market vary with time. A FF is able to improve its pricing 
performance by properly defining its state and action space even though the 
demand and supply vary with respect to time.  
In addition, the simulation result further confirms the conclusion we 
drawn from Expt. 5a (Section 5.4.2.1): whether a FF can achieve its optimal 
pricing performance is determined by its capability to beat its competitors via 
learning. In this experiment, although demand and supply are allowed to vary, 
the best setting for the learning parameters associated with both FFs still 
remains unchanged (same as Expt. 5a). As a result, no matter how the market 
condition and the behavior of shippers/carriers changes, a FF is able to assure 
its profitability by efficient learning and competition with other competing FFs.  




Another similar conclusion (as discussed in Section 5.4.2.1, Expt. 5a) 
can also be drawn in this experiment: the total profit earned by a FF is a result 
of balancing revenue, cost, and volume. For a specific simulation run under the 
best setting for the learning model parameters, the variation of demand and 
supply is presented in Fig. 5.26. Although the demand and supply are allowed 
to very, there is still over supply in the market. The total revenue gained by !!\ 
and !!d is presented in Fig. 5.27. The total cost of both FFs (Fig. 5.28) keeps 
increasing, but the FF who learns by Q-learning (!!\) performs better in terms 
total profit (Fig. 5.29).  Although !!\ bears higher total cost (Fig. 5.28), its total 
profit (Fig. 5.29) and total volume of cargo (Fig. 5.30) still outperform !!d . !!\ also obtain higher market share than !!d (Fig. 5.31). on the other hand, 
although !!\ gains higher total profit (Fig. 5.29), it does not beat !!d in terms 
of average unit cargo revenue (Fig. 5.32) and average unit cargo profit (Fig. 
5.34). The average unit cargo cost for both FFs are around the same level (Fig. 
5.33).  
 
Table 5.10 Best setting for FFs’ learning model parameters (Expt. 5b) 
FF Type Specifications !!\ B4: Q learning K = 0.30, U = 0.05	!!d C: If-then basis +@0 = 0.80	
B4: Q learning 
C: Learn on if then basis presented in Section 4.3.2. 
 





Fig. 5.24 Pricing performance of  !!\ and !!d –total profit earned 
	






































Fig. 5.26 Variation of demand and supply 
	






































Fig. 5.28 Total cost of !!\ and !!d 
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Fig. 5.30 Total volume of cargo earned by !!\ and !!d 
	










































Fig. 5.32 Average unit cargo revenue of !!\ and !!d 
	












































Fig. 5.34 Average unit cargo profit of !!\ and !!d 
	
5.4.3 Asynchronous Time Model  
With the asynchronous time model assumption, the whole analysis horizon is 
assumed to last for P simulation time. There is no “grid” on time axis and events 
may occur at arbitrary moments, exactly when they are to occur.  
	
5.4.3.1 Experiment 5c: flexible demand and supply with two FFs 
In this experiment, the aim is to investigate the performance of RL models when 
the synchronous time model assumption is relaxed. Instead, the simulation time 
is assumed to be continuous and each activity happens at exactly the moment 
























(Expt. 5b), the investigation still focuses on the interaction between three 
shippers (829, : = 1,2,3 ), two FFs (!!0, % = 1,2 ), and four carriers (,., 1 =1,2,3,4). The demand and supply in the market are also allowed to vary.  
Settings for the three shippers remain unchanged as presented in Table 
5.7 (Expt. 5b, Section 5.4.2.2). Each shipper has its own demand for cargo 
movement and selection behavior for preferred FFs. Their respective demand 
for cargo movement varies with respect to time and follows the uniform 
distribution (only discrete values are valid for the demand at a given time point). 
Further in this experiment, the demand for cargo movement from a specific 
shipper is generated at a given time interval of 1 simulation time and repeats 
throughout the entire simulation horizon – 500 simulation time. In addition, 
after sending solicitations to all FFs, a shipper will wait for responses from all 
FFs until: 1) responses from all FFs are received (transition At shown in Fig. 
5.35); or 2) a maximum time period has been waiting for - whichever happens 
first. The above maximum time period can be interpreted as a shipper’s patience 
when choosing a FF, and the above “patience” is assumed to follow uniform 
distribution (B+A%zHDz ∈ ¥H%w≥Ii(0,1]). In the end, the shipper offers all its 
cargo to the selected FF. Setting for shipper agents is summarized in Table 5.11.        
 





Fig. 5.35 The statechart of a FF agent – an asynchronous time model 
 
Table 5.11 Settings for shipper agents (Expt. 5c) 
Shipper Type Demand Patience 
Price 
sensitivity 
82\ B ¥H%w≥Ii 250± 40 ;N/) ¥H%w≥Ii(0.5,1) NA 
82d C ¥H%w≥Ii 200± 40 ;N/) ¥H%w≥Ii(0.5,1)  0.06; 
82t B ¥H%w≥Ii 225± 40 ;N/) ¥H%w≥Ii(0.5,1) NA 
1) Type A: Do not choose the FF who offers the highest or the lowest price; 
Randomly choose one FF among all the other FFs;  
2) Type B: Prefer the FF who offers the Lowest price 
3) Type C: Modeled by the multi-nominal logit model (discussed in Section 
3.3.2.2) 




Settings for the four carriers remain unchanged as presented in Table 5.8 
(Expt. 5b). Among them, two carriers use liner freight rate scheme and the other 
two use stepwise freight rate scheme. The capacity of each carrier varies with 
respect to time and follows the uniform distribution (only discrete values are 
valid for the available slot at a specific time point). Further in this experiment, 
it is assumed that after a specific carrier (vessel) calls the port of city A, the 
carrier will not sail until the expected sailing date (the waiting time of a carrier 
at port A is 0.2 simulation time). Then the carrier will transport received cargo 
from the origin port (city A) to the destination port (city B). The carrier will be 
available again at the original port (city A) after a given time period. The above 
“time period” includes the cargo transport time and the dispatching time, and 
follows the uniform distribution ∈ [0.5,1]. The carrier is then available again 
for the next voyage at the original port (port A). Settings for the carrier agents 
setting is summarized in Table 5.12. 
	
	
Fig. 5.36 The statechart of a carrier agent – an asynchronous time model 





Table 5.12 Settings for carrier agents (Expt. 5c) 
Carrier Type Parameters 
,\ A+C ± = 800 − 0.57; 	D+B+D%A± = ¥H%w≥Ii(300 ± 25)	;N/); waiting	time	at	port = 0.2; AI+H)B≥IA	A%iz	&	F%)B+ADℎ%H@	A%iz = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.5,1) 
,d A+D ± = 600 − 0.37; 	D+B+D%A± = ¥H%w≥Ii(290 ± 25)	;N/); waiting	time	at	port = 0.2; AI+H)B≥IA	A%iz	&	F%)B+ADℎ%H@	A%iz = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.5,1) 
,t B+C 
BI%Dz\ = 750; BI%Dzd = 600; <\ = 125;	D+B+D%A± = ¥H%w≥Ii(310 ± 25)	;N/);	Q+%A%H@	A%iz	+A	B≥IA =0.2;	AI+H)B≥IA	A%iz	&	F%)B+ADℎ%H@	A%iz = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.5,1)	






Settings for the two FFs remain unchanged as presented in Table 5.9 
(Expt 5b). Both FFs are able to learn: !!\ learns by Q-learning and !!d learns 
on if then basis. Further in this experiment, after receiving requests from 
shippers, it takes time for a FF to estimate the potential cost and then make 
pricing decisions (Fig. 5.37). The time it takes to process a request can be 




interpreted as a FF’s “efficiency” in processing requests. The above “efficiency” 
is assumed to follow uniform distribution between [0.2,0.5] simulation time. In 
addition, after sending cargo split plans to preferred carriers, the FF waits until: 
1) all solicitations are responded or; 2) a given time period has been waiting for 
– whichever happens first (Fig. 5.38). The above time period can be interpreted 
as the FF’s “patience” when interacting with carriers. During simulations, the 
patience is assumed to be 0.2 simulation time. Table 5.13 summaries settings 
for the FF agents. 
	
	
Fig. 5.37 The statechart of a FF agent (interacting with SP) – under 
asynchronous time model 





Fig. 5.38 The statechart of a FF agent (interacting with C)– under 















Table 5.13 Settings for FF agents (Expt. 5c) FF	 Type	 Specifications	
!!\	 B4:	Q	learning	
i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	i+I:¥B\ = 100%;	i+I:¥Bd = 200%;	O8\ = 33%;	O8d = 66%;	iB = 3	(9	possible	markup	points);	zww%D%zHD± = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.2,0.50);	B+A%zHDz = 0.2	
!!d	 C:	If-then	basis	
i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	9	possible	markup	points	(same	as	FF\);	zww%D%zHD± = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.2,0.50;	B+A%zHDz = 0.2	B4:	Q	learning	
C: Learn on if then basis presented in Section 4.3.2. 
	
An extensive search was conducted to find the optimal setting for the 
parameters associated with each FF’s learning model. For each combination of 
settings for parameters, the experiment is run for 20 runs and each run lasts for 
500 simulation time. The best setting for the parameters associated with !!\ 
and !!d is presented in Table 5.14. The pricing performance (averaged over 20 
runs of 500 simulation time each) of !!\ and !!d under the best setting for the 
learning parameters is presented in Fig. 5.39 (total profit) and Fig. 5.40 (total 
volume of cargo obtained). By conducting statistical analysis, 20 simulation 




runs are sufficient and we can conclude that: 
A FF who learns by reinforcement learning can outperform its 
competitor when simulations are run under the asynchronous time model 
assumption (Fig. 5.39 and Fig. 5.40). The FF not only gains more profit but also 
obtains higher market share and volume of cargo. The asynchronous time model 
assumption can represent the reality in a more realistic manner. The simulation 
results derived through the interaction between shippers, FFs, and carriers can 
bring more practical insights for FFs.  
 
Table 5.14 The best setting for FFs’ learning model parameters (Expt. 5c) 
FF Type Specifications !!\ B4: Q learning K = 0.30, U = 0.05	!!d C: If-then basis +@0 = 0.80	
B4: Q learning 
C: Learn on if then basis presented in Section 4.3.2. 
 





Fig. 5.39 Pricing performance of  !!\ and !!d –total profit earned 
 
	
Fig. 5.40 Pricing performance of  !!\ and !!d – volume of cargo obtained 
	




































learning model parameters, similar conclusions can be drawn as discussed in 
Section 5.4.2.1 (Expt. 5b): the total profit earned by a FF is a result of balancing 
revenue, cost, and volume. The total profit (Fig. 5.41) earned by a FF is the 
difference between its total revenue (Fig. 5.42) and total cost (Fig. 5.43). On the 
one hand, although the total profit earned by !!\ is higher than that earned by !!d throughout the entire simulation horizon (Fig. 5.41), !!\ does not beat !!d 
in terms of average unit cargo revenue (Fig. 5.44) and average unit cargo profit 
(Fig. 5.45). On the other hand, the average unit cargo cost for both FFs are 
around the same level (Fig. 5.46), but !!\ beats !!d in terms of volume (Fig. 
5.47) and market share (Fig. 5.47). As a result, the combination effect of average 
unit cargo revenue (price), volume and average unit cargo cost make !!\ earn 
more total profit than !!d.  
By examining the same simulation run discussed above, the result 
further confirms the conclusion we obtained by conducting Expt. 5a (Section  
5.4.2.1) and 5b (Section 5.4.2.2): no matter how market conditions and the 
behavior of shippers/carriers change, a FF is able to assure its profitability as 
long as the FF can beat its competitor via competition. For the above simulation 
run, the variation of total demand and total supply is plotted in Fig. 5.49. 
Although the total demand and supply are no longer fixed and for a very short 
time period undersupply may exist, the FF who learns by the Q-learning method 
still outperforms the other FF who learns on if them basis. As a man in the 
middle, a FF may not be able to influence the general level of demand and 




supply, and the FF may not be able to control anyone by himself. However, the 
FF can learn its competitors’ behavior and then adjust its actions accordingly. In 
this way, better pricing performance can be achieved by learning.  
By examining how demand and supply vary over time (Fig. 5.49), we 
notice that there are short periods of undersupply in the market. This is because 
when a carrier is on its way transporting cargo from the origin to the destination, 
the available capacity in the market decreases. Once the available capacity in 
the market can not serve the demand from all shippers, undersupply occurs. As 
a result, this experiment also takes into account short periods of undersupply in 
the market although the market is oversupplied over the long analysis horizon.    
 
	



















Fig. 5.42 Total revenue earned by !!\ and !!d 
	

































Fig. 5.44 Average unit cargo revenue of !!\ and !!d 
	













































Fig. 5.46 Average unit cargo cost of !!\ and !!d 
	














































Fig. 5.48 Market share of !!\ 
	







































5.4.3.2 Experiment 5d: flexible demand and multiple FFs 
In this experiment, the aim is to investigate the performance of RL models when 
there are more than two FFs in the market. We extend the experiment conducted 
in Section 5.4.3.1 (Expt. 5c) by adding three more FFs into the market: the 
interaction between three shippers ( 829, : = 1,2,3 ), five FFs ( !!0, % =1,2,3,4,5), and four carriers (,., 1 = 1,2,3,4) is investigated. The experiment is 
conducted under the asynchronous time model assumption. The demand and 
supply in the market are allowed to vary. Settings for the three shippers and the 
four carriers remain unchanged as adopted in Section 5.4.3.1 (Expt. 5c, Table 
5.11 and Table 5.12).  
During multi-agent simulations, all five FFs are able to learn and settings 
for the learning parameters associated with each FF are presented in Table 5.15: !!\ learns on if then basis; !!d learns by action value method;  !!t learns by 
softmax method; !!Å learns by Sarsa method; and !!™ learns by Q-learning 
method. For the two FFs who learn by associated reinforcement learning models 
(!!0, % = 4,5, Sarsa and Q-learning), their states and action space are defined in 









Table 5.15 Settings for FF agents (Expt. 5d) FFs Type	 Specifications	
!!\	 B4:	Q-learning	
i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	i+I:¥B\ = 100%;	i+I:¥Bd = 200%;	O8\ = 33%;	O8d = 66%;	iB = 3	(9	possible	markup	points);		K = 0.3, U = 0.05	zww%D%zHD± = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.2,0.50); B+A%zHDz = 0.2	
!!d	 C:	f	then	
i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	9	B≥))%C5z	i+I:¥B	B≥%HA);	zww%D%zHD± = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.2,0.50);	B+A%zHDz = 0.2; +@ = 0.8;	
!!t	 B1:	Action	value	
i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	9	B≥))%C5z	i+I:¥B	B≥%HA)	()+iz	+)	!!\);	zww%D%zHD± = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.2,0.5);	B+A%zHDz = 0.2; @IzzF± = 0.05	
!!Å	 B2:	Softmax	
i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%;	9	B≥))%C5z	i+I:¥B	B≥%HA)	()+iz	+)	!!\);	zww%D%zHD± = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.2,0.50);	B+A%zHDz = 0.2; W = 500	
!!™	 B3:	Sarsa	 i%Hi+I:¥B = 0%;	i+7i+I:¥B = 300%	zww%D%zHD± = ¥H%w≥Ii(0.2,0.50;	B+A%zHDz = 0.2; K = 1, U = 0.05		
Based on the settings presented in Table 5.15, multi agent simulations 
are conducted with each experiment running for 20 runs and each run lasting 
for 500 simulation time. The pricing performance (averaged over 20 runs of 500 




simulation time each) of all FFs is presented in Fig. 5.50 (total profit) and Fig. 
5.51 (total volume of cargo obtained). By conducting statistical analysis, 20 
simulation runs are sufficient and we can conclude that: 
Associated RL models (Q-learning and Sarsa) perform better than the if 
then learning model, and they all outperform non-associated RL models 
(Softmax and Action value).  We rank all learning models in terms of pricing 
performance (total profit earned): Q-leanring > Sarsa > if then > softmax > 
action value. The simulation results obtained in this experiment also confirms 
the conclusion we drawn in previous experiments (Expt. 5a, 5b, and 5c): a FF 
who learns by reinforcement learning can improve their pricing performance by 
properly defining its states and action space; 2) whether a FF is able to achieve 
its optimal pricing performance is determined by its capability to beat 
competitors via learning; and 3) the total profit earned by a FF is a result of 
balancing revenue, cost and volume. By examining a specific simulation run 
under the setting for parameters presented in Table 5.15 , we can obtain total 
revenue (Fig. 5.52), total cost (Fig. 5.53), total profit (Fig. 5.54), market share 
(Fig. 5.56), unit cargo revenue  (Fig. 5.57), unit cargo cost (Fig. 5.58), and unit 
cargo profit (Fig. 5.59) associated with each FF.  
	





Fig. 5.50 Pricing performance – total profit 
	
 
Fig. 5.51 Pricing performance - volume of cargo 
 





Fig. 5.52 Total revenue obtained by FFs 
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Fig. 5.54 Total profit obtained by FFs 
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Fig. 5.56 Market share  
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Fig. 5.58 Average unit cargo cost 
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For a given market, more FFs entering the market intensify the 
competition in the market: it drives down the total profit earned by each FF as 
well as the general level of profitability in the market. As a result, shippers can 
benefit from it but FFs suffer from losing more profits. By comparing the total 
profit earned by each FF in Expt. 5c and Expt. 5d (Table 5.16), we notice that 
the highest total profit earned by a single FF in Expt. 5c is higher than that 
earned in Expt. 5d. The total profit at the market level (sum of total profit earned 
by each FF) in Expt. 5c is also higher than that in Expt. 5d.  
However, although new FFs entering a market drives down the level of 
unit cargo revenue (Table 5.17), unit cargo cost for each FF (Table 5.18), the 
combination effect of unit cargo revenue and unit cargo cost drives down unit 
cargo profitability for each FF in the market (Table 5.19). 
 
Table 5.16 Total profit earned by FF agents (Expt. 5c vs. 5d) 
Expt. Total profit earned by each FF 
Total profit at 












5c 205175260.47	91416577.46	 NA	 NA	 NA	 296591837.93	
5d 34853131.01	 15720746.80	 11766195.84	 12660231.41	17349357.89	 92349662.95	
 
 




Table 5.17 Average unit cargo revenue (Expt. 5c vs. 5d) 
Expt. Average unit cargo revenue Average unit 
cargo revenue 












5c 1548.94 1453.52 NA NA NA 1517.31 
5d 822.75 984.07 958.11 905.70 902.88 886.45 	
Table 5.18 Average unit cargo cost (Expt. 5c vs. 5d) 
Expt. Average unit cargo cost 
Average unit 














5c 637.2 634.32 NA NA NA 636.25 
5d 579.92 625.08 672.35 630.5 626.32 612.60 	
Table 5.19 Average unit cargo profit (Expt. 5c vs. 5d) 
Expt. Average unit cargo profit of each FF Average unit 






 (If then) 
!!t 





5c 911.74 819.20 NA NA NA 881.07 
5d 242.83 358.99 285.76 275.20 276.56 273.85 	
Shipper and carrier all benefit from more FFs entering a market: more 
FFs improves the processing efficiency of the market. By examining the 




variation of demand and supply in the market (Fig. 5.60), undersupply in the 
market is less likely to happen although the nature of demand and supply remain 
unchanged as Expt. 5c (Fig. 5.26). It means most of the time, there is enough 
capacity to serve the demand of cargo movement, and thus shorter 
waiting/processing time is expected for shippers and carriers. In terms of 
shippers, it takes less time for a shipper to confirm a FF and have all its cargo 
transported from the origin to the destination. The demand of cargo movement 
can thus be dealt with in an efficient and timely manner. In terms of carriers, it 
takes less time for a carrier to fill its slots. Meanwhile, the carrier is able to move 
more cargo for each voyage, and thus its space can be much more fully utilized. 
 
	






















CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION 
	
Rather than merely reducing operation cost, maximizing revenue, or achieving 
some form of system optimality, this study offers a new perspective to assist 
FFs in their pricing decisions, which takes into account: 1) the potential 
competitive reaction of each party, including competing FFs; 2) the 
decentralized manner of decision making in the logistics market; 3) learning 
through feedback from previous transactions; and 4) the interactive nature of 
the logistics market. Pricing decisions are no longer one time decisions for FFs, 
but are decisions adapted over iterated transactions. 
In the first phase of this research, a GT approach is proposed to 
formulate pricing decisions for a FF when the FF has full information of the 
entire system. The GT approach takes into account the competition among FFs 
and the price sensitivity of shippers. The decision of each party is considered in 
a decentralized manner by incorporating the potential reaction of other 
interacting parties. Numerical experiments were conducted with a set of 
hypothetical values for key parameters – demand and price sensitivity of 
shippers, and the charging scheme and capacity of carriers. The results of these 
experiments are examined by analyzing various performance indicators (e.g. 
unit price, unit cost, markup etc.), and the conclusions drawn will be useful in 
providing insights for FF pricing decisions under competition. In order to 
achieve better profitability, it is suggested that FFs price segment their clients 




because a change in shippers’ price sensitivity leads to a different optimal 
pricing decision. The pricing decisions by FFs should be profit-driven rather 
than cost-driven - they should price their services to maximize total profit by 
balancing price, cost and volume rather than merely trying to increase 
revenue/market share or lower cost. They should also formulate charges with 
respect to level of demand and behavior patterns of shippers/carriers rather than 
using the same markup across all pricing situations.  
However, the pricing decisions derived using the GT approach is 
determined by shippers’ utility functions as well as carriers’ behavior patterns. 
Although a FF can quantify shippers’ price sensitivity and probe carriers’ 
behaviors by evaluating previous transactions or conducting surveys, the results 
would have to be treated with a fair amount of scepticism due to other parties’ 
unwillingness to reveal information. Real data has not been used to test the GT 
model. In the numerical experiments, only sceneries with two actors in each tier 
were examined. Experiments on a larger scale and with multiple players in each 
tier have not been conducted on yet.  
In the second phase of this research, learning approaches are proposed 
to help FFs with their pricing decisions when the FF only has limited 
information of the entire system. A multi-agent system is built to investigate 
whether learning from previous transactions can lead to better freight pricing 
decisions. By examining the effect of various key factors (e.g. number of 





learning parameters, and level of information) on the optimal pricing decisions 
for FFs, this research sheds light on how good pricing decisions can be made by 
learning from previous transactions. The simulation results show that learning 
can improve the pricing performance of FFs but we still need to pay attention 
to the key factors mentioned above. These factors have been shown to affect the 
performance of learning FFs under competition.   
In the third phase of the research, learning approaches proposed in 
Chapter 4  are modified to to help a FF formulate its best pricing decisions based 
on the information that is accessible to him in the real world operations. All the 
information the FF uses to update its pricing decision can be obtained by the FF 
in real world operations. We also examined the scenarios when: 1) the demand 
and supply are allowed to vary; 2) activities and events can occur at any time 
point; 3) more shippers, FFs, and carriers enter the market. The simulation 
results also give several practical insights into a FF’s real world operation. The 
multi-agent system built in this research can also be extended to examine the 
interaction of other combinations of shippers, FFs, and carriers as well as to test 
the performance of other learning models or pricing decision making models.     
However, each multi-agent simulation experiment was run with a fixed 
setting of learning parameters for FFs that learn, although an attempt was made 
to determine the best parameter settings using an extensive search. It may be 
better for learning FFs to explore more in the beginning by adjusting the 
learning model parameters, and then switch over to exploitation. The limitations 




described above will call for further research and study. First, the proposed 
models should be applied in real world scenarios so that the effectiveness of 
each model can be improved. Second, larger scale experiments should be 
conducted so that more practical and meaningful insights into the pricing 
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